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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION 
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, MAY 15, 1967 
Senate 
VIETNAM 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
have read with great interest the speech 
by the distingushed Senator from Ken-
tucky 1 Mr. CooPER l, and I also listened 
to what he had to say and the colloquy 
which ensued subsequent to his deliver-
ance of the speech. 
I commend the Senator from Ken-
tucky !Mr. COOPER] for showing his 
usual calmness, good judgment, restraint, 
and wisdom in what he has to say, and 
to assure him that he has a great deal 
of company in what he has said. 
When it comes to worrying about the 
situation in Vietnam, it Is the shadow 
which affects all our lives, and it is pre-
eminent to the consideration of any other 
question. 
When I think of how much Vietnam is 
costing us in men and money, it makes 
me sad indeed to consider the tragedy 
which is the lot of tlus country in that 
far distant land. 
We became involved in Vietnam be-
cause of mistakes, because of miscalcula-
tions, because of misunderstandings, and 
because of good intentions. 
As was pointed out in the Senate this 
afternoon by the distinguished Senator 
from North Dakota !Mr. YouNG], it is 
too late to question how or why we got 
into Vietnam. The question is moot. It 
belongs to history. There is no question, 
as far as any Member of the Senate is 
concerned that I know of, of withdraw-
ing from Vietnam at this time. But I do 
think the overriding question, if not the 
only question, in the mind of every Sena-
tor, regardless of his position on this sub-
ject, whether he is labeled a dove or a 
hawk, or has no label, is to find a way 
to the negotiating table, to the ways in 
which an honorable truce, or an honor-
able peace or an honorable settlement, 
can be achieved. 
It was brought out that perhaps the 
bombing should be suspended, and that 
thrs would pave the way to negotiations. 
Frankly, I would like to advocate a sus-
pension of the bombing, because I have 
never advocated the bombing itself; but 
I feel, if we were to suspend the bomb-
ing and there were no reaction on the 
part of North Vietnam, the reaction on 
our part, both government and people, 
would be far more bitter and far more 
dangerous than is the situation at the 
present time. 
Perhaps the distinguished Senator 
from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] has given 
us a way out by means of which bomb-
ing would be confined to interdiction of 
supply routes and would increase at the 
17th parallel and along the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail. It is certainly a proposal worthy 
of consideration. 
As far as the membership of this body 
Is concerned, I wish to state that I be-
lieve in the right of dissent. No matter 
how a Senator is labeled, he does have a 
right to dissent and the right to express 
his opinions as he sees fit, but always, I 
would hope, constructively. 
I would not consider even those who 
say, "Go in all the way," or who want to 
turn North Vietnam back into the Stone 
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there Js ever present the possibility of Its 
eruption into a war of regional, continental 
or world-wide dlmenslons. 
The con!llct In VIet Nam may end, of 
course, long before It matriculates Into war 
with China or universal nuclear catastrophe. 
That Is certainly the rational hope Whether 
or not It Is an attaina ble hope Is another 
mater. In any event, the VIetnamese con-
filet now, today, already has the capacity to 
shake the precarious base of cl vlllzed human 
survival. That will continue to be the case 
unt!l the war begins to yield to rational 
settlement. 
Whatever else It Is, therefore, the war In 
Viet Nam Is a most urgent warning to all 
nations. It flashes a danger signal with 
respect to the adequacy of the present Inter-
national Instruments of peace. These in-
struments have not only failed to prevent 
a breakdown of peace In Viet Nam; they 
also appear Incapable of restoring peace In 
any prompt and generally acceptable fashion. 
It Is high time, therefore, to not e with 
emphasis that the structure of International 
order which has evolved during the past 
twenty years Is, to say the least, dangerously 
haphazard. As It Is now, each state has Its 
own formula for safeguarding the security 
of Its people. Each state tends to blend Into 
that formula, In various combinations, a sup-
ply of unl!ateral military power and a par-
ticipation In a variety of bilateral and re-
gional defense arrangements. Each nation 
adds to this mixture Its own vers ion of tradi-
tional diplomacy and modern variations 
thereon. Almost all nations complete the 
blend with a dash of the United Nations. 
Of late. the role of the United Nations has 
become less and less pronounced. Indeed, 
with respect to VietNam the U. N. presence 
Is scarcely discernible. It Is true that the dis-
tinguished Secretary-General. U Thant, has 
taken public note of the confilct In VIetNam 
and Its dangers to the world . The Secretary-
General Is a man of pence and an exceptional 
diplomat. He has made clear that he Is more 
than willing to place his dedica tion and his 
skills at the disposal of the disputants In 
Viet Nam. In his diplomatic role, he has 
outlined views which might provide at some 
points a basis !or a settlement of the con-
filet and he has, otherwise, sought tactfully 
to engage the Interest of various parties In 
a settlement. 
With all due respect, however, the sincere 
efforts of the Secretary-General are hardly 
to be equated with bringing to bear on this 
situation the potentials of the United Na-
tions. VIet Nam Is, clearly, a breakdown In 
the peace within the meaning of the Charter. 
It contains, clearly, the threat of an expand-
Ing war. With these characteristics, It would 
appear that the contuct should long since 
have triggered the utilization of every re-
source of the United Nations In an effort 
to restore peace. Yet, I regret to say, that 
apart from the personal efforts of the Secre-
tary-General, the U.N. reaction to VietNam 
has had something of the character of that of 
a disinterested, enervated or Impotent on-
lookPr. It Is almoot as though the oonfilct In 
VIet Nam were taking place not on the other 
side of this planet but rathe: on some other 
planet entirely. 
It may be, of oourse, that the U . N. Is un-
able to make a contribution to peace In Viet 
Nam. It may also be, however, that the !allure 
to seek a contribution from the U. N . Is a 
missing link In the restoration of peace In 
VietNam. 
Whatever may be Involved, the non-role 
of the United Nations In this situation ought 
not to go unnoticed. An embarrassed s ilence 
1.s no longer a sufficient rooponse to the na-
tion's needs or to the world's needs Urgent 
though It Is, there Is more Involved In these 
needs ev-en than ending the war In VIet Nam. 
There le also at stake the prevention of a 
more monstrous confilct. There le also at 
stake the continued Cl'<Xllbllltv and utility 
of what has heretofore been a fundamental 
Instrument In the structure of world order. 
In my judgment, It Is high time to !ace up 
to the conspicuous absence o! the U.N. !rom 
the VIetnamese dispute. We need to ask why, 
when the need for a peace-el!ort Is maximal, 
the output of the U.N. Is minimal. And we 
need, at the same time, to explore every pos-
sibll1ty for the engagement of the organiza-
tion In the el!ort to bring about a termlp.a-
tlon of the hostilities in Viet Nam. 
The U.N. was an essential element, among 
others, In the Korean cease-fire. Why, then, 
1t.3 inconsequence !n the problem of Viet 
Nam? In this connection, It Is manifest that 
there have been strilctng changes In the 
structure or the U.N. since the Korean con-
filet. Whatever their virtues, It may be that 
these changes Inhibit the engagement of the 
organization In VIetNam. 
The most sweeping change, o! course, Is 
that the U.N. has become a General Assem-
bly-oriented organization at the same time, 
that the membership has grown to over 120 
states. It will be recalled that originally there 
were 51 united nations. Among the present 
members, there are, as there have been since 
the outset, states-Infinitesimal and states-
Immense and, in between, all of the grada-
tions. 
There are enormous differences of slgnl!-
lcance among these states Insofar as the 
practical problems of maintaining peace are 
concerned. Yet, all 120 have equal access to 
ava!lable time In the General Assembly. All 
120 have an equal share In the control of the 
purse. All 120 have an equal vote In deci-
sions of the Assembly. 
It Is hardly an overstatement to note that 
the structure of the General Assembly Is ap-
pallingly cumbersome. Nevertheless, the As-
sembly has made and It can continue to 
make Important contributions of a long-
range and peripheral nature to the strength-
ening of world peace. With all due respect, 
however, there Is doubt that a body con-
stituted as the General Assembly now Is can 
play a slgnlfican~an executive-role In 
dealing with Imminent threats of war or 
In the re-establishment of a peace that has 
broken down. In my judgment, the General 
Assembly Is not competent for that purpose. 
In my judgment, It Is delusive at this time, 
to expect It to discharge functions o! a kind 
which might be helpful In Viet Nam. 
It Is conceivable that alterations In the 
structure of the General Assembly might 
remedy Its Inadequacies for peace-keeping or 
peace-restoring purposes. Francis Plimpton, 
a former U.S. representative to the U.N. was 
right, perhaps, when he suggested that the 
organization was In need of "family plan-
ning." It might be that the use of a single 
spokesman for groups of small states would 
be helpful. It might be, too, that the cluster-
Ing of smaller states In to one vote on some 
power-projected formula would be helpful 
In Insuring fiscal responsibility and a meas-
ure of realism In the significant political de-
cisions of that body. I have no doubt that 
there are any number of technical changes 
which, given sufficient time, can be absorbed 
to great advantage In to the structure o! the 
General Assembly. 
But In all frankness, I must say that In-
sofar as Viet N am Is concerned, there Is not 
a sufficient margin of time. Moreover, It Is 
not at all certain that the kind of whole-
sale reconstitution o! the General Assembly 
which would give It a peace-keeping func-
tion In Viet Nam and similar situations Is 
either practical or desirable. As I have al-
ready noted, the General Assembly has other 
u seful, long-range and peripheral functions 
ot peace. Its value for those purposes should 
not be jeopardized by projecting It Into sit-
uations for which It was not designed and 
for which It would have to be severely re-
shaped If It Is to be effective. 
It seems to me practical, therefore, to look 
elsewhere In the U.N. structure !or a slg-
nlficant contribution to the restoration of 
peace In Viet Nam. The Charter clearly In-
dicates that, veto or not, we should look 
first to the Security Council. It may be valid 
to assume that the Security Council Js less 
useful as an Instrument of peace-keeping 
when permanent powers are In disagreement. 
But It Is not at all valid to assume that the 
Security Council Is useless In those circum-
stances. That the Security Council may not 
be able to play the central role In questions of 
peace does not rule out 1 ts playing o! any 
role. 
Whaever differences may separate them 
with respect to VIet Nam, the permanent 
powers of the Security Council, I believe, 
have all expressed their grave concern wl th 
the situation and the urgent need to do 
something about lt. That Is an entirely ade-
quate basis, It seems to me, on which to 
turn to the Council and seek from It a con-
tribution to the restoration of peace In Viet 
Nam. 
Let me make clear that miracles are not to 
be expected. All that can reasonably be asked 
Is a wholehearted el!ort to do what can be 
done to further peace. The least that should 
be expected, or accepted, It seems to me, Is a 
wllllngness on the part or the Council to 
confront the Issue o! Viet Nam and to con-
front It soon. 
One cannot foresee, of course, what can be 
most helpfully done by the U.N. What ought 
to be clear at this point, however, Is that 
doing nothing In the U.N. has not helped In 
VIet Nam. There are discernible lines of pos-
sible U.N. contribution which, it would seem, 
warrant the fullest exploration. 
One of these lines, for example, leads from 
the Security Council to the International 
Court. All of the combatants In Viet Nam 
have affirmed, I belleve, the fundamental 
relevance of the Geneva Accords of 1954 as 
the basis for settlement o! the con.fllct. Cer-
tainly, the United States has done so. 
We need to know, authoritatively and Im-
partially, what the requirements may be In 
current circumstances !or the reassertlon of 
the Geneva Accords as a legal basts !or a 
restoration of peace. We need to know, too, 
what must be done sooner or Jatar by all the 
parties directly or Indirectly Involved In the 
Vietnamese conflict to comply with the 
Geneva Accords and so establish conditions 
for a just and acceptable peace. In the cir-
cumstances, therefore, It might be useful for 
the Security Council to ask an advisory opin-
Ion of the International Court on these ques-
tions. 
It would seem to me, too, that the Security 
Council Is an appropriate setting tor a cards 
on-the-table consideration of the present po-
sitions of all the participants--direct or ln-
dlrec~and those deeply Interested in the 
contuct In VIet Nam. Certain of the states 
such as the United States, the Soviet Union 
and France are present as permanent mem-
bers of the Council. The problem of partici-
pation of the others Is not Insurmountable 
In the light of the experiences In the Korean 
case. In that Instance. It wlll be recalled, an 
invitation was Issued to Peking-a non-
member of the U.N.-to come to the Security 
Council and Peking did present Its case and 
participate briefly In Its discussions. 
It a consideration of the question o! Viet 
Nam before the Security Council Is to have 
maximum utility, there needs to be present 
not only the Soviet Union, France, the United 
States and other Securl ty Council members 
but also China and North VIet Nam and the 
National Liberation Front, as well as Saigon. 
In a confrontation or this kind, we may be-
gin, at last, to understand whether It Is dis-
trust, disinclination, disdain, density, or 
whatever which has so far stood In the way 
of negotiations for an honorable settlement. 
We may begin, at last, to measure rather 
than guess the gap which must be bridged 
In the restoration of peace In VIet Nam. 
To be sure, the prospects o! a refusal of 
the Invitation are obvious. To be sure, the 
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th pro ls, that v.e do not expect 
mlracl , that we keep our heads, and 
that '\loe do not indulge 1n personal!U 
In closing, I emphasize that the re-
ponslbiUty for the conduct of our Na-
tion's foreign affair is v ted 1n the 
Pr !dent of the United States Whether 
v.e a r 'l\1th him or dlsagr , '1\hether 
hP plea cs or d.lsplen s us, v.lll not 
Ugh n one Iota the onerous burdens 
'1\hlch rest on his shoulders as a result 
of the VIetnam confilct The PI csldent 
may look for advice to his aides 1n the 
executive branch. He may look to the 
Senate and to the people of this Nation 
Whether or not advice Is forthcoming, 
whether or not there Is consent to his 
cour e, the President still must decide 
v.hat he believes to be in the best In-
t-er ts of the United States. That Is his 
r ponslblllty. He cannot share It He can 
only assume It on behalf of all of us 
In this most perilous hour, Mr. Presi-
dent, 1 thlnk the President needs and 
should have our understanding, our 
help, our prayers, and the support which 
can be given to him In good conscience. 
It ought to be borne In mind at all times 
that whatever contribution this Nation 
can make to a peaceful settlement In 
Vietnam, that contribution can only be 
made and w!JI be made on behalf of all 
of us, In the end, by the President of the 
United States. So I would hope, Mr. 
President, that this suggi'Stlon. made 
first at Johns Hopkins, later repeated at 
the University of North Carolina, and 
still later at The Temple 1n Cleveland, 
a suggestion made originally by the dis-
tmgulshed senior S-enator from Oregon 
!Mr. MORSEl and others, that we go to 
the Security Council. and that we ask 
the U.N. to face up to Its re~ponslbllltles, 
will be taken to heart by the ndmlnlstra-
tlon, and that some action along these 
Jines v.·!JI get underway. As I have said 
before, the hour is growing late. There 
Is not too much time left. 
ExlllBIT 1 
\"IETNAM AND Til& UNITED NATIONS 
(Address by Senator MIKE MANSI'U:X.D, Dem-
ocrat, of Montana, .Johns Hopkins Unl-
ve.rslty, the George Huntington Williams 
Memortnl Lecture, Nov, 10, 1966) 
I ha'l'e come h~re from two weeks of pol-
lt1ca In Montana EII!<:Uon.s In my State 
usually Involve a great deal of personal u-
chango w1th voters. Tbls year was no excep-
tion. Although not running myself, I found 
the campalgn aa Intensive as Montana Ia 
extensive. It carried Me Into confrontntlon 
w1th many. many Americans over a troll of 
thousands or Inllee I had occasion to speak 
to Montanana on the range, In the hi h 
mountains, along the roods, at ranch and 
resen-atlon, and In vlllage, town. and dty. 
Polltleal campaigning Is not as It might 
appar to be an exhausting pursuit On the 
contrary at least to the polltleally nsltlzed, 
It Ia a kind of restorative It reactivate the 
ability to dllrerenUate between what Is Im-
portAnt and what Is grossly o er-rated tn 
the public a.ll'alra or the nation Tbat essen-
tial penpect.lve may I say Is frequently dis-
torted ln the political prtsms or Wa.ahtngton 
.\ campaign may be d lgned to lntonn 
the votM" but It 1so lnt l'tl18 the campaigner 
lt unfolds the deep dlsquleta aa well u the 
h whlch move In tbe political substruc-
ture of the nation h ectl n camp gn, 
In l<hort.. Is a rcdi!K'O cry of tbe hUIIUUl aide 
o! Am rtcan public l•Je 
1 meet w1th you treab from an e>:posure 
to a c:roa-aectlon 1 Amer an senUment u 
It ulsta In Montana where the frost hu lo 
~n on the pum,pkln and tb ano 0! wtn-
tu hav already begun to t.her l m t 
wtth )'OU still strongly aetud wtth what 11 
c1 est to the h t of the peop e of m St.a te 
I have found tn 26 yean of pub c life that 
on tund~~.mental matters ertl Is n t much 
d1lrerence between a ntanan outlook and 
the nat.lorml outlook I U&Ume. therefore 
t.hat the bMic oonc rll8 of the people of 
Mont.ann are your baalc concerns Just M bnalc 
ho are also probably similar. In short, I 
nssume that what Ia moat Important In Mon· 
tana Is also likely to be moat Important here 
In that .eln, I Wls.h that I might say thM 
the legislative record of the 8 th Congress 
or some speclftc upect of It Is of fundamental 
Interest to Americana at this time As you 
know, the Senate and House de It v;lth a 
gre t range of public problems during the 
past two years. Tbe&c problems havtng ac-
cumulated o.er a long tlme, had arisen to 
chAllenge not only the stability of the na-
tion's political and social atructur but even 
the adequacy of the nation's phySical en-
vironment 
In my Judgment, a very substantial legisla-
tive base hw; now been lnld for mcctln these 
problems. Tbe record of the 89th C)ngress Is 
Indeed. extraordinary In scope. Tbc cogno-
men, "Great Congress" may well be apt In 
any event, as a parllclptult, I should like to 
tblnk so. 
Yet, In all honesty, I cannot claim that t.he 
legislative achievements of these two yeara 
are n response to what Is m t basic In the 
concerns and hopes of the people or the na-
tion. I regret to say thnt theee acnlevements, 
however slgnUlcant, r.re obscured In the 
shadow which VIet NIUil luui cast over every 
n peet of the life of the nation 
The preoccupation of Americans remains 
VIet Na.m and Ita Implication. E'cry day, 
these Implications grow more persorml and 
direct for more youth and their flllllllles. Tbe 
wa.r Is clearly the nexus of the national 
anxiety. And peace lies at the heart o! the 
nation's hopes; peace--Ita honorable restora-
tion at the earliest poSEible moment. 
I know that you hrn-e heard a great deal 
or VIet Nam over many months It Is a sub-
Ject from whlch you might welcome a mea£-. 
ure of surcease. By the same token, I would 
prefer to oonslder some other lesa vexing 
question, perhapB even the outcome of the 
election. Yet I am Impelled to return •" thla 
critical matter tonight. 
As you may know, problems of foreign rela-
tion shave concerned me for many years and, 
out of that concern, I have frequently ad-
dressed myself to the VIetnamese question. 
1\fy views on the situation there are generally 
known and I do not Intend to repeat them 
In detail here. Certainly, I have said time and 
aga!n-ln public statements as v;ell as In the 
prtvate councils of the government--that It 
does not matter much, at this late date, ~!lw 
we became Involved In VIet Nam. Tbe point 
Is that we are Involved, deeply lnvoh d, and 
we cannot and we wlll not w1thdraw In the 
absence or an honorable settlement of tbls 
question Nevertheless, I believe (and I have 
so stated many times) that It would be to 
tbe benefit of all concerned 1! there could 
be an lmmecUatc contraction of the hootlllt:ea 
and, as ooon as poe31blc thereafter their m-
plete teiTnlnn tlon 
I have long ~n persUaded tha tb,. In· 
tor ts of the U nlt.ed States ca ortzc us aa 
a Pa.c1flc power but that th.oee 1ntereetll Dl06• 
certainly do not eotn~nt:nd to us tb roe 0! 
Asian power. As a Paclflc power rather than 
&n A&lnn power (and the two are aometlm 
contused) It Is, In my Judgment v;ho y In 
our national lntcest to remo e Amcrl.can 
military Installations and forces from the 
entire Soutbeo.l!t Aa1An mainland as .IIOOll 
as that can be dono--e.s aoon ae an honomb e 
e Is B6SUl'ed 
y I say that that 'lev. a.ooords w1th the 
President's proclaimed purpoee In VIe am 
whlch Ia a <;ettlement achle ed by n 
6 3 
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prospects o! a high declble of propaganda 
and Invective, I! the Invitations are accepted, 
are equally obvious. But these are risks 
which can readily be sustained when the 
stakes !or all concerned are as high a.s they 
are In VIet Nam. Insofar as the United States 
Is concerned, It le In the Interest of this na-
tion to welcome the confrontation. The open 
bar o! world opinion Is one before which we 
must never hesitate or !ear to place this 
nation's policies. 
The courses which I have Indicated are 
llustratlve of the poosibll1tles of using the 
untapped resource<~ of the United Nations 
to advance towards peace In VIet Nam. They 
may or may not be relevant at this time. 
A vigorous effort on the part of the U.N. may 
prove a.s futile as all other efforts to date, 
military and non-rnllltary, to terminate the 
conflict. But with the world enmshed In the 
most dangerous lntemational situation since 
Korea, we must seek by every avenue to fa.c!ll-
tate the restoration of a just peace In Viet 
Nam. We owe that to the unfortunate people 
of that nation, to ourselves and to the world. 
ExHIBIT 2 
CENTRAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
(Address by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Dem-
ocrat, of Montana, before the Carolina 
Forum, the University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, N.C., Mar. 13, 1967) 
Prior to my corning to Congress a quarter 
of a century ago, I thought my stock of 
solutions to the questions o! foreign pol!cy 
was quite adequate. In !act, as a teacher of 
history at the University of Montana, which 
I was, I had a touch o! what Senator Ful-
brlgh t mlgh t call the arrogance of brain 
power. In more oommon Idiom, there were 
time when I thought I knew It all. That 
may I say, Is a falling common to exceptional 
historians, from Herodotus to Schlesinger. 
As a new Member of Congress, my back-
ground In history was highly useful. I also 
discovered, however, that my knowledge of 
international affairs did not go very far. 
It did not begin to provide much of an under-
standing, let alone answers, to the critical 
issues which were emerging as World War II 
drew to a clooe. In those days, most of us 
In government suffered from serious Imper-
fections In our not.lons of the outside world 
and widely-held but unfounded hopes !or 
an automatic postwar peace under the United 
Nations. 
We took many wrong tacks along with the 
right ones In the course o! our foreign poHcy. 
For many decades to come, historians will 
be engaged In sorting out the one from the 
other. We made mistakes In Asia. We made 
them In Europe. We made them In the UnLted 
Nat.lons. We made them over the whole range 
o! emerging new International issues. 
I, for one, felt my limitations and rec-
ognized the need to become a student again. 
My classroom was Congress, in Committee 
and on the floor. My extracurricular activity 
Included a great deal of foreign travel, exten-
sive reading and not a little reflection. 
To this day, a student I have remained; an 
expert I am not; and teaching is the profes-
sion to which, at some point, I may return. 
In the latter connection, I should note that 
my name Is stlll carried, on leave of absence 
on the rooter o! the University o! Montana: 
Moreover, thanks to a seniority system In 
college teaching. second not even to that or 
the Congress, I now hold the rank o! full 
Professor of History. 
I am constrained to point out that teach-
Ing and legislating are the two outstanding 
examples in AmeriCan society o! the applica-
tion o! a major tenet of Confucianism; that 
the accumulation of years 1.s to be equatec: 
automatically and unquest!onlngly with the 
accumulation o! wisdom. Tbls principle. I 
know, Is Insufferable to the young tolerable 
to the middle-aged, and a comfort to those 
full of years. At this point In time, I must 
confess that I find a system o! seniority 
tolerably comfortable. 
For the present, I have no hesitancy In 
Invoking the authority with which seniority 
endows me, In order that I may speak to 
you on what seems to me to be the central 
concerns o! contemporary American foreign 
policy. Since the end of World War II, I 
have watched clusters of international prob-
lems coalesce Into these concerns. Tbe prob-
lems cover a whole range of new and tumul-
tuous change. Tbey are, In part, Ironic by-
products of the Immense acceleration o! 
development In science, education and com-
munication, transportation and other tech-
nologies. Tbey are expressive o! the explosl<>n 
In population as well a.s the explosion o! 
nuclear devices. Tbey are Indicative of the 
growth of human expectations and, hope-
fully, of human enlightenment. Tbey are 
problems, however, which despite these new 
twists, are stlll undergirded by the vast 
heritage of human Ignorance, fear, want, and 
hostility from which no part of the globe, 
is free. 
The Iceberg of change which has moved 
In International affairs during the past two 
decades helps to explain the emergence o! 
the U.N. and other International organiza-
tions. It Is relevant to the social !nstab!ll ty 
and the militarism which have largely fol-
lowed the ending of 19th century colonial 
era, notably In Africa. It is Involved In the 
Asian catacylsrns--the great economic stir-
rings In Japan, the immense uncertainties 
which brood over India and Pakistan and the 
political tidal waves which, at intervals, have 
rolled through Chinese society. 
The many-sided changes In the human 
condition during the past two decades also 
explain the first military alliance In peace-
time between ourselves and Western Europe 
as well as the first major military Involve-
ments o! the United States on the Asian 
mainland. They help to explain, finally, the 
awakening o! this nation to the problems 
which confront the world and ourselves as 
participants In Its lndlvislble destiny. 
It used to be that we tended to stand 
apart and aloof from the affairs of the rest 
of the globe. Some have called that period of 
our history whlch led up to World War II, 
the age of Isolation. The characterization is 
glib and somewhat misleading. We were not 
so much isolated as we were Insulated by a 
fortuitous geographic endowment. The great-
er part of the nation's historic energies, 
therefore, could, and fortunately did. go In-
ward Into the development of a rich, ample, 
and sparsely settled land. We had little 
need or Inclination which would stimulate us 
to look much beyond this endowment !or 
our needs and-!! I may use the term-for 
our kicks. Except to sustain a limited curl-
ooity and to satisfy a few exotic wants, we 
avoided an extensl ve overseas projection of 
American power, particularly outside the 
Western Hemisphere. From a distance, we 
were content to hold ourselves up to the rest 
of the world, on the basis of great material 
achievements and the political heritage o! 
the American Revolution, as a prime exa.fnple 
of the perfectablllty of the national expe-
rience. 
Since World War II, however, we have 
found ourselves plunged, hands, feet, and 
head into the mainstream of the world's af-
fairs. We did not seek this role. We did not 
want it. Most o! us still find the clothes 
o! a great International power, costly, lll-flt-
tlng and uncomfortable. Nevertheless, we are 
unable to get out or them. There is even the 
probability that some o! us have learned not 
only to tolerate this new garb, but to !Ike 
lt. 
In any event, as a sequel to World War II. 
this nation has come onto the' center o! the 
stage o! International affairs. In this leading 
role we have expended an immense amount 
o! resources, energy, and money for a great 
variety of purposes. We have developed all 
manner of costly Intelligence and ln!orrna-
tlonal services. We have developed towering 
military services whose annual cost Is now 
around $70 billion. 
We have fought one war In Asia, and are 
now engaged In a second. We have narrowly 
missed Involvement In several other pe-
ripheral clashes elsewhere. More than twenty 
years after World War II, we still have some-
thing on the order of agreements !or mutual 
security with 40 or more nations. These 
agreements, In effect, are commitments to 
mllltary action everywhere on the globe, ex-
cept, perhaps, the Antarctic. The strategic 
air force Is on a minutes-alert. Intercon-
tinental and other missiles are pre-set for 
Instant retallatory launching. Day and night 
the American navy patrols the seven seas. 
American soldiers are stationed In many na-
tions abroad; In Europe and VIet Nam, they 
number In the hundreds of thousands. 
These far-fiung commitments have been 
questioned from time to time. In my Judg-
ment, It is most proper that pertinent ques-
tions be raised about them. Not only do they 
Involve great expenditures of publlc funds, 
they carry, at all times, immense Implica-
tions for the very survival o! the nation and 
clvlllzatlon. As I see It, we have undertaken 
so many and scattered defense obiiga tlons 
that any need !or the simultaneous honoring 
o! a group of these commitments would find 
us hard-pressE'd to provide even a llmi ted re-
sponse. For that reason, l! for no other, 1 t 
seems to me we would be well-advised to look 
closely at these military commitments and 
activities and to weigh carefully their con -
temporary value. 
It would be futile, however, to consider 
them In a vacuum. Effective surveillance 
must relate to the central concerns o! our 
foreign pollcy wl\.lch, presumably, gave rise 
to them In the first place. It behooves us to 
see as clearly as possible whether our under-
standing of these concerns Is up to date. It 
Is Incumbent upon us to test and test again 
the reflexes of our policies not only for ade-
quacy but for excess. 
It wlll serve no useful purpose to continue 
to measure these reflexes o! policy by the 
sort o! generalltles which are expressed by 
the terms "Isolationism" or "lnternatlonal-
lsm." Whatever may have been the case years 
ago, these yardsticks have long since lost 
their pertinence. The labels are no guarantee 
of the efficacy of any course of action or non-
action In International relations What Is 
essential Is not the name. What is essential 
is that the course Is timely and adjusts the 
bonafide interests of the nation to the reali-
ties of the contemporary world. 
I speak In all candor when I say that there 
have been tendencies under both Democratic 
and Republican administrations for foreign 
policy to lag behind these realities. Until re-
cently, a kind of Inertia, for example, has 
ex1sted with regard to one of the central 
concerns o! American foreign rollcy the 
Unl ted States-Soviet con!ron tatlon in Eu-
rope. Until recently, we have been most re-
luctant to bring ourselves to face, In policy, 
the changes which have taken place on that 
continent. 
To be sure, President Eisenhower sought 
In his administration to restore at least a 
measure of clvillty in the conduct of U.S.-
Sovlet affairs, by his personal associ a tlons 
with the leaders o! the Soviet Union. To be 
sure, President Kennedy, In the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity which, !or 
years had decreed that ag"eements should not 
be concluded with the Soviet Union. It has 
only been in the last year or two, however, 
that as a nation we have begun to explore 
fully the Implications o! change In Europe 
and to react to Its potentialities In terms o! 
our Interests and world peace. 
Yet substantial change has been manifest 
!or some time In Inner developments In both 
Eastern Europe and ln Western Europe and 
between the two regions. In Eastern Europe, 
the immediate postwar Isolation from the 
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w t ,.... a &e\'tte on~ It wu compounded of 
po IUcal and war-born 'l'endettaa ld oglcal 
parochl&llmu reciprocal fe&n~ d th ln· 
t. rn o: human e e:gy t.o meet the m.a&-
aln denuwds o: p. t-war reoonstru uon. 
p«Jally n the death of lin, howevCT, 
there baa been a nernl loosenln of the 
ldoologlcal and othtt at.ralt-Jac:kel.a through· 
out Enatern Europe There haa also been a 
growing r ponae on the part or ov mmenta 
thtte t.o consumer needs, tbc a Ua!act on or 
which lnvol<'es greatly expanded comm rce 
wllh the non-C'.ommunlst world 
Aa lndlc the o: the bre:u!th or change, 
communlcaUOD4, travel, cultural rxchange 
and other contacts have grown rapidly be· 
tween F MLem and We tern Europe The rl e 
or trade Ieala betw n the two regloiUI bns 
been very pronounc~ and It should be noted 
that, Berlin Wall notwithsta.ndlng W t Ger-
many lends all other non-Communist na-
tions In commerce with F.a.aUrn Europe 
For th~e who read the ten lea""' ot omclal 
IIOCinln.blllty, moreover, I would call attention 
t.o the recent \isll.a of President l'odgorny or 
tho Soviet Union to Italy and the first rr<:cp· 
tlon ot a Chic! or that State by the Pope, u 
well a.a Premier Kosygtn'a warm rr<:eptlons In 
Paris and London One may attach such 
values &.a he choo&ea to the&e e>enl.a. The 
facts o! change In Europe, bowe,·er, speak 
for thernsel vea. The talk o! war aubsld!es; the 
sounds of lntrn-European cooperation a.re 
hen.rd more clearly on all sides The European 
detente has not only begun, It Is already well 
advanced. 
Our reaction to change In Europe Includes 
the groundwork o! PrP.sldrnt Eisenhower and 
President Kennedy a.a well ns the bridge-
building or President Johnson nil or which 
I have already mentioned , 
What Is Involved In the !attn case Is a 
•ustalned effort In the direction o! restoring 
normalcy to our relations with the Sov1et 
Union and a s!gnltlcant reduction ln the 
m!lltn.ry rl\'alry which, wittingly or un-
wittingly, could lead to a catastrophic con-
filet. 
A number o! s!gn!tlcrmt agreements with 
the Soviet Union are already Involved In this 
effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, 
consulnr questions, commerclnl aviation, and 
the peaceful use or outer space. Negotiations 
nre also anticipated, In the near future, to 
try to llmlt the Incredibly costly rh"Biry or 
adding successive and reciprocal "anUs" to 
the ballistic missile systems o! each nation. 
An attempt l.s also likely to be made to re-
move certain long-standing and self-Imposed 
hindrances In law to our peaceful trade "1tb 
the Eastern European countries. 
Many or these measures, or course, In-
volve not only the President but also action 
by the Congress nnd, partlculn.r!y, by the 
Senate. And, certainly, they Involve under-
Btn.nd!ng on the part Of the people Of the 
nation. However, emot!ona run deep on any 
question o! U.S. relatlon.s with Communist 
nations, particularly, In the light or the 
bloody conftict In VIet Nam. I am !rank to 
say that I have my own reticences about the 
pursult or agreemenl.s with nations on one 
side or the globe, while a war against us 
Is being waged with tbelr help on the other. 
The best Judgments we can obtain, however, 
tell us that the rejection or the contemplated 
agreements with the Soviet Union nod Ea.st-
ern Europe wtll not make the allghtest dlf-
!erence In the situation In \'let Nam It wlll. 
ln no way, diminish our casualties or hasten 
the conclusion of the con111ct. 
In tboee clrcumatances, I do not see that 
It aervee our purpoees to turn our backs on 
agreements which would otherwise be In the 
lntereet o! this nation I do not see that we 
&dva.nce the cauae ot peace by re!ustng to 
build more stable relaUone !or peace when-
ever and wherever an cppcrtunlty to do ao 
preeenta Itself. 
MOrt'Onr, brldge-bulldl.ng to Ea.stern Eu-
rope Ia not unrelated t.o the poulbiUty or 
making tructl e cbA 
.A l&n t e Tre:l r Orga uoo. 
ld &lao ~,... the natl '8 I 
many years .x d! na or .Am 
have n ed to ..AT 0 
Europe Tb t 1"(' and tb r 
to lve n u.s mtll ry 
w tern Europe or ,. ell o r 1 
Arne rlcaiUI It l.s an unc1 r k1 
r nts an expenditure r b ll 
or public !uncls h ~ r Ye 
begrudge one cent o! th ru 
persUAded that the x d!v 
s nt!al to p.eace In Europe tod y 
,.ere bellc•ed to be when dl p tched 
yut11 ago 
But 18 ~bat the 
Uoned the change ln U e g 
tn Europe which expr Itself In a rapidly 
groW1ng tnule and the cxp:ms n o! other 
friendly relatlOIUI It shou d also be noted 
that within Western Europe, th re are ob-
' !ous doubl.a a.bout the ne~ r r the m:.ln-
tcna.nce o! N.A To nt the strength In which 
It was previously projected Indeed, the 
French no longer sec any requirement tor 
the presence or U.S !ore , at lel>'t no In 
I'rance, nnd they have withdrawn their ov;n 
detachments !rom N A T 0. Command The 
United Kingdom has reduced 11.8 commitment 
or men and resources to the Continent and 
hna announced further reductions unless 
WC6t Germany La prepared to neutrallze the 
exchange C08ts or m:.lntn!nlng these forces 
on the Rhine Other \'/estern Europeans to 
a greater or lesser degree appear to regard 
their NAT 0. commitments In the same non-
urgent fashion 
It Is now ,·ery evident that the United 
States c.lone has felt deeply the need to sus-
tain the full military burden ot the eo.rller 
common commitment to NAT 0 Our all.es 
In Western Europe are much cl06cr to the 
firing line; yet, In n period of unprecedented 
economic prOI'pcr!ty they arc most unwilling 
to carry their pledged share. In effect, the 
Wcstocn I:.'uroprans have mnde adjustments 
In their commitments to NAT 0 to rctlect 
0' er-nll changes In Europe and they have 
ma.de these a.dJustments unllnterally, 
'Ibe contrast In performance between our-
selves and Western Europe regarding com-
mitments toN A T.O tn my Judgment Is be· 
coming almoot an embarrassment. It moves 
us apart !rom the malnstrcam or European 
developments and La likely to become n source 
or !rlctlon on both sides which, tn the end, 
can only be harmful to the Inter ts of both 
sides. 
In all !ranknC68, I :O.nd It dliDcult to ac-
quiesce ln Executl>e Branch rears !or West-
ern Europe's safety which are obviously r:u-
greater than the fear o! the Europeans tbcm-
•ch·es. In all !ra.nkne&s, I find BOrne lnck O! 
dlgnlty In the lengths to whlcb these !ears 
have carried our diplomacy. We ha>e begged, 
badgered a.nd buttered Western Europe In 
an effort to at!muiatc a greater contribution 
to N.A.T.O. In all fran.knC38, I did not relish 
this nation having been pl.a.ced In the posi-
tion or wearing out Ita v.elcome !u France. 
I should not llke to see thnt experience re-
peated elsewhere In Europe Yet It may well 
be repeated unless there Is a willingness to 
ma.ke timely a.djustmenta. 
I have, therefore, joined wltb 43 other 
Senators In the Introduction of a resoluUon 
which recommends to the President that the 
Executh·e Branch make substantial reduc-
tions ln the present deployment or C'ur forces 
In Western Europe Personally, I have !elt 
tor several yeat11 that. t"o or three rather 
than alx dlvtalons would be more than su!-
flclent to undenrcore our adherence to the 
North Atlantic Treatv That figur Ia ln line 
with estimates or present need ,.b'cb have 
been advanced by General Elscnbower and 
General Gavin, both or whom have had • 
lon association with this quea • n I :O.nd 
It morst dLmcult t.o romprebend why two 
d!Vl.s!ona are any leas e'"ectlve than alx In 
TE May 15 1967 
Within Ch.lna, during th .,. yMrs !.here 
have ~n momentous e•ents which hnvc also 
added to the dlmcult!ea and uncertalntl,. 
or developing a cohesive policy tow1U'da the 
Chlnet.- mainland The Chin have <X· 
ploded nucle.'>r devlcr.a nt I..op Nor In the 
Western Asian desert or Slnkb.ng !!< cr.nt 
Ideological con1l!cts have sent great tr<·mors 
through the whole or the Inn•,- political 
structure or China There lull been, llnnlly 
the great cleav ge In Sino-Soviet re,olu-
t!onary solidarity which hna tom np:>.rt at-
moot all or the relationships between th.e 
tw.:> giant nations o! the F.uru!an Continent 
In the context of these "' rnl.8, It Is n t 
rurprlslng that the dust. !or the settlement 
of wblcb American policy baa waited eight-
een ye:>ra Is benv1er than ever The obscurity, 
moreover, Ia not likely to be dlspell~ In the 
n r rut re Th~re Is nothing In the recent 
history o! China ,. hlcb sugg 1.a that It wll! 
be euler tomorrow than It Is today tor us to 
see cl rly & direction for ellectlve policy 
Whatever course or ~rlc;J,n relntloiUI with 
China, It "'Ill have to be pursued In spite or 
the dust with which the s!tuntton Ia co er~ 
C'Jear-eut cbolcea cannot be expected to b 
avallnble to us any time tn the !or e b e 
future On the contrary, .American decl.stona 
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respecting ChinA must tnev!tably contal.n a 
larg~ measure o! subjectivity and prayer. 
Ever-present, WUl be the posslbU!ty of error. 
These considerations, may I say, apply not 
only to wbat we may do respecting China but 
to what we do not do. The uncertainties and 
the risks exist no less In the principle or 
non-approach to which we have adhered 
over these years of our times. History will 
someday estimate the contribution of this 
prtnc!ple-lts addition to or subtraction 
from the Interests of the United States and 
the stab!'!ty and peace o! the Western 
Pac ftc. 
Under the present approach. !or example, 
we know from a distance that a great fire 
rages In the core o! Chinese Communism. 
The man!!esta.t!ons are plain 1n the roars 
of the Red Guards, In the denunciations and 
counter-denunciations, In the sudden fall o! 
long-estsblished revolutionaries. They are 
documented In the Inflammatory Ideographs 
which are slashed over the streets and walls 
of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese 
Communist power. They are suggested In the 
polltlcal bewilderment which Is seen In 
coastal cities and In the provinces along the 
Inner borders of China and other remote 
arens. 
Indeed, the present turmoil is such as to 
make clear that Communist political control 
which, for nearly two decades, was held by 
many to be total and Irreversible and to ex-
tend all the way from MoSCO'V to the farthest 
reaches of China is actually considerably less 
than absolute, even In Its extension from 
Peking to the distant Chinese pro\1nces. 
We can also note. from afar. the serious 
difficulties between the Soviet Union and 
China. The strains have long been explicit 
In the Ideological realm. They have alw be-
come Increasingly evident In the tension 
along the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs 
!or thousands o! miles between the two 
countries. What appears Involved here Is an 
expression of the historic projection or 
Czarist Russian Interests across the Asian 
mainland towards Alaska and which, before 
It receded to more tractable limits, had 
spread even as far as California and Hawaii. 
This basic Russian projection to the East 
persists and rubs against China, at least In 
border regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and 
In Sink!ang Province. Conversely, an historic 
Chinese Interest remains in many parts or 
Soviet Asia which at various times have been 
under at least nominal Chinese authority. 
The clash or national Interests of the two 
nations, in short, Is very real and so, too, are 
the Irredentist host!l!tles which It engenders. 
These hostilities have been a mnjor element 
In the cycle or ever-Increasing bltternesB In 
Chinese-Soviet relations over the past few 
years. How long this cycle w!ll last and how 
It wtll end a.re matters of conjecture. What-
ever the posslb!l!t!es. if any, of more etrect!ve 
adjustment or our pollcles in the llght of this 
and other trends, however, we a.re inhibited 
from their pursuit by our current approach 
or, rather, non-approach to mainland China. 
Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and 
over-rld1ng problem of policy, to the situa-
tion In VIet Nam. VIet Nam atrecte every 
other upect o! our foreign relations and, 
particula.rly, the two central ooncerns. It di-
minishes our capacity to deal oonstruct!vely 
with the United States- Soviet confrontation 
In Europe. To put It mildly, it multiplies the 
problems of the oon!rontatlon wtth China 
1n Asia. 
It Is ironic that once again In Viet Nam, 
M in Korea. a country so small and remote 
from our interest<~ as to be outside the range 
or even public curiosity a few years ago ha.a 
become the major preoccupation of the 
United States. It Is Ironic that, !or the sec-
ond time in a generation, we find ourselves 1n 
a devastating war on the borders o! Chlna--
not with China-but with a people who have 
had no tradition o! hostility towards the 
United States and who have !a.r more hie-
torte reason than do we !or mutual hootlllty 
with the Chinese. 
How deeply we are engaged 1n this Ironic 
situation Is indicated by the current concen-
tration of United States military force In 
Southeast Asia and, particularly, In VIetNam. 
We have well 1n excess of 400.000 millta.ry 
personnel on the ground in South Viet Nam. 
There are also approximately 75,000 men on 
the 7th Fleet in adJacent waters and 35,000 
more in Thailand wtth responsibilities that 
are tied closely Into the situation In Viet 
Nam. In short, wa have committed to this 
oontllct over 500,000 members or the Armed 
Services and materiel and equipment in un-
precedented quantities and this Immense 
consignment Is supported by additional mlll-
tary strength o! all kinds on Okinawa, the 
Ph!l!pp!nes, and Guam. 
We a.re in a limited war In which, by be-
coming deeply engaged, we have managed to 
save !rom collapse the government o! South 
Viet Nam In Saigon. The objectives of our 
military engagement are confined entirely to 
the southern half o! VIetNam. This llmlted 
wa.r of limited objectives, nevertheless, ha.s 
already engaged more American forces than 
Korea. It has cost more than Korea. It has 
Incurred plane and hellcopter losses greatly 
In excess o! those In Korea. It Is a more diffi-
cult and dangerous war than ~area. It Is a 
more bitter and barbaric wa.r. It Is a war 
whose end is not yet in sight, by military 
action or by a negotiated diplomatic solu-
tion. 
That Is the reality or the situation in VIet 
Nam. The more candidly it is faced the better 
off we wlll be. At this point, the question of 
how or why we became Involved is moot and 
so are regrets over our involvement. In my 
judgment, the question now Is how can this 
war be ended at the soonest possible mo-
ment in afi honorable peace tor ourselves 
and !or all deeply enmeshed in !t. In short, 
the question is how can It be ended under 
honorable circumstances, before the spread-
Ing devastation, not only In North VIet Nam, 
but even more, In South VIet Nam, makes a 
hideous mockery of the original objective of 
helping the VIetnamese people. 
I do not belleve that we can end this war 
by slogans o! "get In or get out." It cannot 
be endeii by personal criticism o! the Presi-
dent and the Vice President, Ambassador 
Goldberg and other leaders of the Adminis-
tration or members o! the Senate, regardless 
of the positions which they take on this issue. 
I am !rank to say that this crt tlclsm, a~ 
times, goes far beyond the merely ungracious 
and borders on the d!sgracerul. President 
Johnson wants this war ended 1n an honor-
able peace and every Senator I know, and I 
know them all, wants the same thing. I! 
there a.re differences among us they a.re dif-
ferences o! understanding, Interpretation, 
and method. 
In my persona.! view, and have made It 
clear many times, the contllct cannot be 
terminated In an honorable fashion by a 
withdrawal or the United States at this time 
although an honorable settlement must 
eventually involve the withdrawal or United 
States forces. 
The only practical avenue which I see 
open, for the present, Is to seek to mitigate 
the horror o! the conflict and to restrain Its 
spread, while endeavoring to pursue any ave-
nue, byway, route or whatever, a.s the Presi-
dent haa sought to do, which might lead to 
the negotiating table. That there has not 
yet been an initiation or substantial con-
tact tor peace Is no argument against the 
continuance o! the effort to make that con-
tact. There can be no relaxation until the 
war Is brought to an end In negotiations. It 
ts essential that we pursue peace in VietNam 
in all s!ncerl ty and with au diligence not only 
because, In this situation, peace has a ration-
al and moral validity, but also because a 
prompt settlement Is 1n the Interests of the 
Vietnamese people and the interests of the 
American people. 
I must say, with great regret, that s!gn.s 
or a settlement 1n the near future are lack-
ing. There is, Instead, the !act or an ugly 
war or spreading devastation. All the while, 
the options a.re runntng out; the alterna-
tives which might lead to negotiations grow 
!ewer. 
Many proposals have been put forth and 
rnnny have been explored. As an example, 
over the past year or more I have publicly 
called attention to these possible easements 
o! the s! tuatlon and !or ~entual settle-
ment: 
1. In lieu or aerial bombardment or North 
VIet Narn, the sealing off of the borders of 
the 17th parallel, through Laos; 
2. A reconvening of the Geneva Conference 
on the basis or the 1954 and 1962 agree-
ments by call or ti1e cochairmen, the United 
Kingdom and the Soviet Union, or by any 
participating conferees; 
3. An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or 
Tokyo or any other suitable location to con-
sider the conditions or an honorable peace; 
4. The Inc! us!on in any peace conference 
of whatever belligerents may be necessary 
to br1ng about a termination or the conflict 
In VietNam; 
5. An enlargement of the Manna Confer-
ence of 1966 into a follow-up conference, to 
include friend and foe alike; 
6. A race-to-!ace meeting or the Secretary 
of State, Dean Rusk, and the Foreign Min-
Ister o! the Peking government to discuss 
the restoration of peace in VIet Nam. 
In addition, I have urged that the closest 
consldertalon be given to Informed French 
views on VIet Nam and to the views or the 
Cambodian Premier, Prince Noroctom Siha-
nouk. I have urged that the proposals of U 
Thant and Mrs. Gandhi be considered. I have 
endorsed various statements or the Presi-
dent, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Gold-
berg, all of which have made clear that not 
only our proposals but also those of Hanoi 
and the People's Liberation Front might pro-
vide a basis !or settlement. I have recom-
mended tR.at there be not just a cessa t!on 
of the bombing of North VIet Nam but that 
all killing stop, on both sides, In a cease-
fire and standfast, on the ground and In 
the waters adjacent to VIet Nam as well as 
over Viet Narn, to the end that efforts may 
be made to initiate talks. 
In some or these proposals, the President 
has concurred and has had them pursued by 
his diplomats. All or them, he has had 
examined and if they have not been pur-
sued, I can only conclude that there have 
been sound reasons for not pursuing them. 
Suggestions for peace have come from many 
sources; the actual pursu! t of peace in the 
past year, however, has been by diplomacy 
and, largely, by secret diplomacy. Indeed, 
that Is t!le case even with the efforts or the 
distinguished Secretary General or the 
United Nations, U Thant. In his attempts to 
bring about peaoe in VIet Nam, U Thant 
has acted in his personal and diplomatic 
capacity rather than 1n hl.s Secretarial capac-
Ity of carrying out organizational decisions 
or the United Nations. 
The !act Is that the U.N., as an organiza-
tion, has not yet entered into the VIetnamese 
problem. Some limited use of the U.N. In this 
fashion, may I say, was proposed In an ad-
dress which I delivered at Johns Hopkins 
University in November, 1966. At the time, 
it was not suggested that the United Na-
tions be brought directly into the substance 
of the dispute; that cou"e presents great 
difficulties because neither North Viet Nam 
nor China a.re member states. What I did 
suggest, however, was an entirely proper and 
preceden ted procedural 1n! tia ti ve by the 
United Nations. The Security Council can 
Issue, at any time, by majority vote a call 
to all belligerents In Viet Nam to convene 
In Its forum. It would be entirely In order 
tor an Invitation o! this kind to Include 
both China and North Viet Nam. 
It was further suggested last November 
that a basis :ior a negotiated settlement could 
begin to be sought In a Security Council re-
quest to the International Court !or an ad-
visory opinion on the appllcablllty o! the 
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that were the operative provisions or a. num-
ber of these commitments to come Into play 
simultaneously, our ability to discharge 
them, short of nuclear confla.gra.tlon, would 
be most doubtful. 
In my judgment, all outstanding military 
commltments and activities ought to be 
subject to continuous scrutiny as to their 
current validity. From time to time we close 
surplus ml!1ta.ry bases at home. We ought 
not to be reluctant, In any sense, to reduce 
costly commitments abroad just as rapidly 
as their utlllty becomes questionable and 
their foreign pollcy purposes obsolete. 
In this connection, I would note the large 
U.S. mil!tary deployment In Europe. For a. 
number of years, six U.S. divisions have been 
stationed In Western Europe under NATO. 
These forces plus dependents add up to a 
quasi-permanent military establishment In 
Europe of over half a m!Jllon Americans. 
The annual outlay for this commitment 
amounts to b!lllons of do!Jars. Many have 
urged a. reduction of the deployment on the 
basis or cost or the gold drain and balance 
of payments dlfficultles or because of the 
competing needs of Viet Nam. The costs of 
the European deployment, to be sure, are a 
pressure on the domestic economy and the 
International position of the dollar. The ex-
panding war In VIet Nam, to be sure, Is a.n 
open pit In terms of Its ever-growing require-
ments for men, sk.llls, and materiel. 
However, the critical Issue with respect to 
the U.S. deployment on European soU Is not, 
In my Judgment, a financial one; nor Is It the 
competing needs of Viet Nam. It we require 
the present level of forces In Europe, the 
nation can find a. way to deal with the finan-
cial and other difficulties which may be In-
volved. The Issue Is whether our security, the 
security of the North Atlantic region and the 
security of Western Europe-twenty years 
after World War !!--continue to compel the 
concentration or six American dlvlslons on 
tho other side of the Atlantic. 
What Is Involved here Is the accuracy of 
our current estimates of one of the critical 
components of our foreign policy. We need 
to ask ourselves whether conditions In Eu-
rope have changed since NATO was estab-
lished. We need to ask ourselves whether the 
present level of the American comml tmen t 
Is out of step with that change. 
Let us not delude ourselves; while our 
military deployment under NATO has not 
changed for many years, circumstances In 
Europe have changed greatly In recent years. 
They have changed In Russia and Eastern 
Europe. They have changed In Germany and 
Western Europe. When the troop commit-
ment to NATO was assumed, the keynote of 
relations between the Soviet East and West-
ern Europe was one o! mutual suspicion and 
hostlllty. That Is not the case now. Today, 
the tone of Intra-European relations has the 
ring of a reasonableness that borders on 
cordlallty. 
Vice President Humphrey, on returning 
from his recent trip to Western Europe, was 
quoted as predicting that In 20 years the Iron 
Curtain would be replaced with an open 
door. Whatever the situation may be two 
decades hence, I venture to suggest, today, 
two decades after World War II, that the 
door Is already much more than sllghtly ajar, 
as between Eastern and Western Europe. 
The change ln the general climate Jn Eu-
rope Is reflected In the attitudes of the West-
ern Europeans toward NATO. At one time, 
the European allles joined with us tn a w!Jl-
lng pledge of manpower and resources to 
the buildup of NATO. Today, the actions of 
the Western Europeans speak far louder than 
words. The actions suggest that they have 
long since abandoned earller common con-
cepts o! NATO force goals, at least lnso!ar 
as providing their share of manpower and 
materiel may be Involved. 
The French reaction In this respect has 
been abrupt and to the point. Although still 
adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty, France 
has withdrawn all divisions and other de-
tachments from NATO. Moreover, President 
de Gaulle has required the removal of NATO 
headquarters from French territory. Great 
Britain has decreased Its commitment or men 
and resources to NATO and Is contemplating 
a further cutback of Its army of the Rhine. 
Indeed, all of the European NATO members, 
to one extent or another, have lowered the 
priority they attach to their mllltary con-
signments to the NATO command. 
It can hardly be financial dlfficultles that 
have caused the European all1es to veer 
sharply from earl1er mill tary pledges; In an 
economic sense Western Europe is far more 
capable of meeting these pledges today than 
when they were made. The retrenchment, In-
stead, appears to be grounded ln the convic-
tion that the style ln which NATO was origi-
nally taUored ls no longer the mode for 
Europe. 
In these circumstances, It seems a paradox 
that we-alone and apart from our Western 
European all1es-have felt some compell1ng 
need to maintain at full strength the pledged 
deployment of forces In Western Europe. The 
fears for the safety of that region against 
Soviet aggression are obviously far greater 
In the Executive Branch of the United States 
government than they are In the European 
chanceries. 
This variance of view emphasizes the cata-
leptic nature of our pollcy on troop deploy-
ment ln Europe over the past few years. Of 
late, there have been lndlcatlons of a relaxa-
tion In this rigidity. Even though the reduc-
tions In the deployment which are being dis-
cussed would appear wholly Inadequate, It 
Is to be hoped that there Is at least a better 
appreciation of the realltles of change In 
Europe. 
Early this year, I joined with 43 other 
Senators In introducing a resolution which 
recommends to the President that the Ex-
ecutive Branch make a substantial reduction 
In the U.S. m1!1tary deployment ln Europe. 
In my judgment, the actual size of the U.S. 
establ1shment In Europe ought to bear some 
relatlon.;hlp to what other NATO members 
are prepared to do with regard to the com-
mon defense. On this basis, I have belleved 
for some time that two or three U.S. divi-
sions would be more In accord with current 
realltles than the six which are stationed in 
Europe. The lower figure would be no less 
effective In emphasizing that we regard the 
pledge of mutual defense of the North At-
lantic Treaty as binding and that we hold 
our national security as Inseparable from that 
of Western Europe and the North Atlantic 
region. 
In all candor, I belleve there have been 
strong tendencies to lnertl.a ln foreign policy, 
under Democratic no less than Republlcan 
admlnlstrattons. The NATO situation, as I 
have just discussed It, 1s but one case In 
point. A lag Is also reflected In pollcles to-
ward Eastern Europe. Only In recent years 
have these pollcies begun to take cognizance 
of the changes in that region. 
It Is true that President Eisenhower sought 
in his admlnlstratlon to reverse some of the 
excesses or cold war recrtmlnatlon. He tried 
to restore at least some c1v111ty to the con-
duct of U.S.-Sovlet affairs, for example, by 
his personal association with Mr. Khrush-
chev and other leaders of the Soviet Union. 
It Is true, too, that during President Ken-
nedy's administration, the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty removed a rlgldlty which !or years 
had decreed that no agreements, regardless 
of how useful, should be concluded with the 
Soviet Union. It 1s only been 1n the last year 
or two, however, that as a nation we have 
opened our eyes to the extent o! change In 
Eastern Europe and have begun to explore 
vigorously Its potentlalltles. We tend no 
longer to react with an automatic "nyet" 
when opportunities for understanding and 
mutual advantage appear. Rather, there Is a 
new sense or discernment which weighs op-
portunltles In terms of our national Interest 
and lmpllcatlons for a more durable peace. 
The fact Is that such opportunities have 
been manifest for some time as a result not 
only or changes In Eastern Europe but also 
In the attitudes of that region towards West-
em Europe. After World War II, the schism 
In the continent was a severe one. It was 
compounded of ancient rivalries, war-born 
vendettas, ldeologlca.l parochialism, recipro-
cal fears and the Inner ab<;orptlon of human 
energy In order to meet the great demands 
of survl val and reconstruction which existed 
In each war-shattered region. 
After the death of Stalln, however, there 
was a general loosening of straitjackets 
throughout Eastern Europe. This develop-
ment was manifested ln various ways and 
notably In the growing response to consumer 
needs on the part of the Communist govern-
ments. The satisfaction o! these needs, In 
turn, Involved expanded commerce with the 
non-Communist world and Western Europe 
was quick to welcome lt. 
The rise of trade levels between the two 
regions ln the past decade has been very 
pronounced. It should be noted, moreover, 
that--Berlin Wall notwithstanding-West 
Germany leads all other non-Communist 
nations In commerce with the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe. There has also been a 
rapid growth of communications, travel, 
cui tural exchange and other contacts be-
tween Eastern and Western Europe In the 
last ff!W years. How far this process has gone 
1s Indicated by a recent Yugosla vlan an-
nouncement that visas would no longer be 
required of visitors !rom the West! 
These !acts o! change In EUrope speak for 
themselves. The talk of war subsidies; the 
sounds of intra-European cooperation are 
heard more clearly on all sides. In short, a 
European detente has not only begun, It is 
already well advanced. 
Our reaction to change In Europe Includes 
the lnltlal achievements of President Eisen-
hower and President Kennedy to which I 
have already alluded, as well as the lnterna-
tlonal bridge bu1ldlng upon which President 
Johnson has embarked. What Is Involved 
In the latter case Is a sustained effort In the 
direction of restoring normalcy to our re-
lations with the Soviet Union and other 
Eastern European nations. At the same time, 
the President Is seek.lng a significant re-
duction In the m1lltary-technologlcal rivalry 
which, wittingly or unwlttlngly, could lead 
the world Into a catastrophic conflict. 
A number ot slgnlflcant agreements with 
the Soviet Union are already associated ~th 
this effort. They deal with cultural ex-
changes, consular questions, commercial avi-
ation, and the peaceful use of outer space. 
Negotiations have been Initiated to try to 
11m1t the lncredlbly costly arms competition 
of adding successive and reciprocal "antis" 
to the balllstlc missile systems of each na-
tion. Most recently, as I have noted, a Con-
sular Treaty with the Soviet Union has been 
ratified and just a few days ago by a vote or 
88 to 0 the Senate consented to the ratifica-
tion of a treaty on the peaceful use of outer 
space. 
Emotions run deep on any question of U.S. 
relations with the Communist nations, espe-
cially In the llght of the bloody conflict In 
Viet Nam. I am !rank to say that I have my 
own reticences In this connection. The pur-
suit o! agreements with nations of Eastern 
Europe seems incongruous with the war that 
Is being waged against us wl th their help on 
the other side of the globe. The best judg-
ments we can obtain, however, tell us that 
the rejection of the kinds of agreements 
which have been made or are projected with 
the Soviet Union and other Eastern Euro-
pean countries w!ll not make the sllghtest 
difference In the mllltary situation ln Viet 
Nam, that It wlll, In no way, dlmlnlsh our 
casualties or hasten the conclusion of the 
conflict. 
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In Lha.e drcumata.n l do no a that 
It '"' our p~ to tum our ba b on 
agr m~nta which ld otheJTt.ec be In the 
Inter ta or thts nauon I do not eee that we 
adv ~ tb gmcral cau.e or by rdua-
ln to bUild more at.able r laUona whcne er 
and wher ever an opportunity to do eo 1s 
r nt~ 
11 the changes In Europe conaUtutc one 
or the critical components or the altuauon 
"'1th which United States foreign policy muat 
cone m IL&el!, a aeoond Is to be round In 
Aaln Along the II ttoral o! Ute Western PnciOc, 
thcr looma th" unapoken but no l pro-
round confrontation with Chinn across the 
tea of Korea, Japan, Taiwan nnd VIet 
l'iam 
In that region, we hn. e Jet to r ohe the 
dlhmmu ot policy "hlch •orm posed by 
the O<erthrov.• 0( the nnltonal gO\Ctllment 
on the Cblne•e mainland almoet two decades 
ago That cat.aclyamtc e•ent compelled the 
complete recasting o! our r<'.latlona ,.1th 
China In thr •race or a !ew postwar years, 
the framework of our relations with tl>e Chl-
n~e c ntml government altered from one or 
grent Intimacy to one or grnat hostllttr 11><' 
Hu lana replaced U8 In the role of !rlcnd 
and mentor In the formulations or policy 
which were undert.llken by the Peking Peo-
ple's RC'publlc. 
C1111t In the role ot foreign de<ll by the 
new lfO\~rnment In Peking, our policy to-
wards the mainland became a non-policy 
or n~esslty, we settled bnck to • walt a.nd 
6CC" And through the admlulatrntlona of 
three Pr ldenta, we have continued to look 
for the happening which has not happened 
We have yet to se-e clearly either a way to 
put together the pieces or the policy which 
collapf<C<I years ago or a way to begin afresh 
In our relatione with the Chinese mainland 
Contacts between ourselves and the Chi. 
D«'ll<' mainland hnve dwindled almost to the 
point of non-exlstt'nce. Americans do not go 
there; mainland Chinese do not come to the 
United Stat.es. At Intervals, Us. diplomats 
have had slgnltlcant encount.crs with Pek-
Ing spokM'men on various Issues In 1050, 
for example, we faced Chlneo!e Comrnunlst.a 
at the United Nations, on the IRSues of the 
Korean conftlct. WC' sat down "'1th the Chi-
IIC"<' again nt the Geneva Conferences of 
1054 nnd 1962. on the Issues of Indo-Chlnn . 
One channel or continuing diplomatic 
oontact with the Peking government hns 
been mnlntnlned for many years. It hns 
conslstC'd or regular meetings, first In Ge-
neva nnd then In Warsaw between the United 
Stnte• nnd Chinese Ambassndors accredlt«'d 
to Poland These conversntlon,_.brlef en. 
count.<'ra, perhape, would be a bettt'r t.<'rm-
have occurred with great regularity but not, 
to my knowledge, with result.a o! any real 
Import. 
The absence of travel and diplomatic ex-
change between China and the Unltt'd States 
hu been accompanied by a mutual nb tE"n-
tlon from other customary International re-
latlonsblpe, notably th06e of trade. The fact 
Is that lUI a matter or omctal policy, we have 
"'ant.<'d no part or trade with China Thnt Is 
a policy which did not begin "'1th the new 
bltterneaa generated by Vletnnm. It Is more 
than a dec.nde old We are the only nation 
In the world, so tar as I am aware, which 
hu sought tor years to enforce not only " 
prtmar • boycott on Chine e export.a but also 
a •econdary boycott on re-exported Chinese 
producta. 
If the original seeds or h06 lllty were 
ao.,.n, u noted, In Chinn's great revolu-
tlonan· upheB•al, they came to !rultlon In 
the Kor an conntct In which thousands or 
cnsunltl~ were Inflicted on en.ch slrle That 
blood\· clat.h WIUI followed bv n near contllc 
0\er .tbe Chinese Islands of Quemoy e.nd 
.latau In the Taiwan Struts. !'ow, once 
aln In \'let Nam the unresohed hostility 
v.ith China tbrea~na to brtng about an-
oth~r blood)" mllltnr; eng ement between 
ours lv~ and the Chinese. 
,RE~ 10. 'AL Rf. 
b 11 <n tbts au 
and n cla.ah In the '\\ 
b not aurprlalng tha we ar 
a poll c:r pr -...a It and 5l!e r e• even ta 
lnald Cblna ba'l'c aupplltd addlt onal b 
the fonnulAUon of po&l ve po 1 n on 
hlna v. e ace th ev n ts not thand 
ot COUI'R but a ond nnd third-hand How-
nvtr lncomplet thts vtew mny be It 1s allll 
atJfficl•nt to t-ell ua that the Chin ha\e 
ntered the r nb or th nations ... tth the 
c pablllty or tnOicUn • nuC'I ar devut.atlon 
It La ~•1dcnt, moreO\ < r, that thcr Is In pr 
r even now a r;r at ld I 1 I a rtr 
,. hlch gna.,.,. at the Inner core of Chine 
communism The epltheta and the accusa-
tions nnd the pro t-march and th In· 
fianunatory slogans t()JI us that poilU 1 In· 
trospecUon In China Is Vf:l'}' deep e.nd wlde-
apre d at this moment.. Ita lmpact Ia being 
felt partlcularls In the co I clll ,.bleb 
hlatorlcally hnve hou d strong W tern ln-
Oucnce and In the provtnc~ along the Inner 
hOrders which have long felt the pull of the 
Hu tan prr..sence. 
Ironically, the So\leL Union hna now 
joined the United Stnt<"s u anathema In the 
policies of the Peking government Tho ori-
gin or Sino-Soviet dlfficultl<'s can be trnced 
historically to the Imperial projection which 
carried Russian lnftuence unrlrr the Czars 
across the Aslnn mainland lni<J AIMka and 
M fnr as California and Ha,.nll before It 
began to retract. Over the ccnturl there 
h:we been Sino-SO\ lrt cia hes In tho hOrdcr 
regions of Manchuria, Mongoll1 and Sln-
klnng Indeed, where\ rr there Ia 11 com·er-
gence ot the lnteresta or China and Hussln 
across the expnnses or the tribal lands of 
Crntral Asia, ancient antagonisms ha\e pe-
riodically been reactlvat.od In my judgment 
the e historic antngonlsms have been n rae-
tor S!'Cond not even to Ideological dlfl'crences 
In contributing to the blttcrllc.ss and 
estrangement In Chlnr e-So\ let relations 
ovcr the P"-•t ""'eral years. 
However serious the current dlfficultle.s, 
we ought not to Indulge ourscl~·es with the 
<'xpcctallon that t.hey will &<>lve our problema 
In VIet Nam or A•la. Recent developments 
ronrernlng the supply or mntt'rlcl to North 
VIet Nam underscores this point In spite 
of the blttt'r antngonlsm, the Soviet Union 
and China have managed to work out an 
agreement which lnsurr.s the transshipment 
or Soviet supplies by wny or Chinn to Nortb 
VIet Nnm. The prospect would appear to bP, 
moreo\'er, tor a diminution rathrr Ulan an 
Intensification of Sino-Soviet ant1p11 hl~s at 
this time. Indeed, In the absence of basic 
changes In the situation, the level or Int-er-
dependence between Russin. and Chinn Is 
likely to continue to rl•e the longH the 
Vlrtnamese conftlct perslsta. 
In any event, we are restraIned by the 
"wnlt nnd SPe" approach from mnklng ad-
justments of policy which would tnke cog-
nl?.&nce or changes In the Sino-Soviet situa-
tion I might add that we hn\'e wnlt.<'d for 
years, but It Is doubtful that we see our 
wny nnr more clearly today with respect to 
China than we did a ct~cade and a hlllf ago 
China remnlns a pu7.zlement, compounded of 
Ita Immense complexity and our profound 
be"'1lderment. It Is not likely thn events 
In Chln.'l. will ever fall. like Chinese cheek-
era, Into some simple pattern which will 
make It easy for us to de\ elop n ne"' policy 
v.1Lh respect to the Chine e mainland and Its 
three-quarters of a billion people WhntE"ur 
course we follow will lnvol<e n great meas-
ure or uncertalnlty and a high de.gree o! 
rlllk 
That Is true for our pre!: nt cour e or, 
more accuraiPly t!ie non-course Ha\e we 
dared t.o nsk ourselves, lor exnmple, ,. he her 
or not the tt'n or flrtoon ye:u-a In which 
policy hns been In abeyance In regard to 
the Chlne<;e mainland might bear some re· 
sponslblllty for Ute tragedy In v."hlcb we 
are pres nur lnvolvoo In VIet !'IUD? 
I.e me urn, hen to that trag dv to 
\1et !'am It ts the crltlcnl :ocus o: thl n -
A year and n h. l r ago, I returned from \'lr.t 
Nnm rmd reported to Con r nncl th< l'rt al-
dent that we were engag• d ln ,.hat w In 
etTcct. an op<"ll·f'nd~d wnr whO!-n conclusion 
was not ln ah•ht At that tlmn, the rornrnlt· 
mrnt or U 8. fore~ hnct not yet rrnrhHI I 50.· 
000 nnd Ole bornblng or the north "ns 
sharply circumscribed A r~w days ago t h" 
Commnnder of thr. UniH•d SU1tea tore~ In 
VIet Nam, O•nernl W~_,;trnoreland, l<llcl 
con,·entlon or the Assoctn.t~d Prf"..sa ••r do 
not see nny end or the war In sight." In thr. 
months brtwffn these two commt'nts. thrre: 
hns be(;n the lrnnH•fUie Increase both In tho 
US. manpower commitment nnd thr. Jnu I 
of mllltnry \lolence The Viar, howevrr re-
mains open-ended, thrrn Ia not tn al~>;ht any 
mtlltnry ... ay to a conclusion ,..hlch br.nrs " 
rational relation hlp to the original purpot;" 
tor which the commitment "'as undf'r hn 
It will be recalled that that purpolt' ,.1\1 to 
help the people or South Vtr.t Nam prr rrvc 
their fre~dom or polltlral choice and to as-
sist th~m and all the p ple or Southeast 
Asla to build a belt< r mntr.rlal litn tor 
them elves 
Howe..er It mny evenlllally be brought to 
an end, It see-rna to me that thn war In 
VIet Nam ls not .,;otn to be rf"SSl\·ed hy p~r­
sonal criUctsm such u th:ll "'hlch from Ume 
to time, has been almffi at the Pr !den 
the VIce President, Amb ndor Ooldb,rg an<l 
othen Nor, may I say, "'Ill I b resohed by 
he 'lfllng o! the cora rucUve debet• o! 
dlf!~:"renccs In or out or the Senate Differ-
ences o! viewpoint, responalbly nrrlved at 
nnd responsibly eJ~pr ed In my judgment 
are """"nttal to n solu ton In VIet Nnm rtn-
trnlned and th u ·httul d b e ot policy 1s 
not a luxury I Ia n n ty 
Iruwfar lUI Pr !dent J ohnson Ia con rrned, 
he 1s op<'n t o any au • Ions "'hlch may 
cmergn from dlacu I n nnd d bate nnd which 
may hold some prom e or pea~ 11 kna...,. 
as do ...-e thnt the crucial qu Uon ts not how 
thta war began but ho"'' thla war can t • 
ended at th" rll t lble m mcnt and tn 
an honorable manner An honorable ndlng 
1s not olng to be brought about by urn-
pi c r rmulaa sUCh na get all the "'ay tn• 
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or "get all the way out." An honorable end-
Ing Is not going to be brought about by the 
spread of m111tary violence, "'1th Its attend-
ant tragedy !or all VIetnamese. north and 
south, for ourselves. and !or all concerned. 
President Johnson's concern with this 
tragedy Is as deep as yours or mine-deeper 
perhaps because he has to llve with It twenty-
four hours a day. The ultimate responsl-
blll ty In his and, for him, there Is no sur-
cease. 
Insofar as the Senate Is concerned, there 
nrc many viewpoints on VIet Nam, but there 
Is unanimity on the deslrab!llty o! a prompt 
ending or this war In an honorable peace. 
Indeed, a !ew weeks ago by a vote of 89 to 2 
the Senate endorsed a continued search by 
the President and others for a negotiated 
settlemcn t of the conlllct. 
As for myself, I have expressed the view 
many times that the only practicable course 
Is one which seeks to contain a further 
spread or the conlllct In Asia, one which 
seeks to limit our involvement In the con-
filet while the effort to achieve an honorable 
settlement Is Intensified. The !allures so far 
to find the formula which might tend to lead 
to negotiations, In no sense, dl vests us o! the 
obllgtlon to ourselves, to the VIetnamese 
people and to the world to continue the 
search. 
To that end, many suggestions have been 
made. Over the past year or so, for example, 
I have publicly proposed the following· 
I. Military emphasis should be placed on 
scaling of! or t!:le northern border of South 
VIet Nam at the 17th parallel by the con-
struction o! a line of defense which could be 
maintained largely by South Vietnamese 
forces as an alternative to the continued 
bombing of the north. 
2. The reconvening of the Gene> a Confer-
ence on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agree-
ments, by call of the co-chairmen, the United 
Kingdom and the Soviet Union or by any 
other participants; 
3 . The holdlng In Rangoon or Tokyo or In 
any other suitable place of an all-Asian con-
ference to consider the conditions o! an hon-
orable peace In VIet Nam; 
4 . The Inclusion ln a peace conference on 
Viet Nam o! any and all governments or 
groups whose concurrence may be necessary 
to bring about an end to the conflict; 
5. The broadening of the M.mlla Confer-
ence of 1966 to Include China and other non-
participating nations In Asla; 
6. The arrangement o! a face-to-face meet-
Ing of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the 
Foreign Minister o! the Peking government 
to discuss the restoration o! peace In Viet 
Nam. 
rn ad<lltlon, I have suggested that our pol-
lcymakers examine with great care, the views 
expressed by the French government, as well 
as by the Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom 
S!hanouk. I have urged that the proposals 
o! U Thant and Mrs. Gandhi receive con-
sideration. I have endorsed various state-
ments of the President, Secretary Rusk, and 
Ambassador Goldberg, all o! which have 
made clear that not only our proposals but 
also those o! Hanoi and the People's Libera-
tion Front might provide a basis for settle-
ment. I have recommended that there be not 
just a cessation of the bombing of North 
VIetNam but a general cease-fire and stand-
fast, with a halt on both sides. to maneuvers 
on the ground In the S~3. and In the air, to 
the end that e!Torts might be made to Initi-
ate talks. 
Many others In the Senate and elsewhere 
have o!Tered suggestion~. There has been 
no lack of proposals . Many have been pur-
sued through the channels of tradl tiona! 
diplomacy. The distinguished Secretary-
General of the United Nations, U Thant, has 
been a central figure In these secret dtplo-
matlc efforts to bring about peace. In spite 
of his great efforts and those of other diplo-
mats and men of good w!ll, peace ls no 
closer. 
This factor has led me to question an 
apparent reluctance to bring Into play the 
more formal machinery of the Charter of 
the United Nations In an effort to break 
down the barriers to peace. I question this 
reluctance again today. The fact Is that the 
U. N., to date, has not even taken official 
cognizance of the existence of a conflict 
In Viet Nam. That sort of ostrich-approach 
seems to me to court for the organization 
Irrelevancy a~ best and eventual disaster at 
worst. 
I do not believe anyone has a right to 
expect, with respect to Viet Nam, a miracle 
o! peace from the U. N. I do believe, however, 
that the peoples of the world have a right 
to expect some public Indication of con-
cern of member nations, as to the dangers 
of this conflagration. There Is a right to ex-
pect, at least, some e!Tort to use the ma-
chinery of the Charter to dampen down 
the flames in Viet Nam before the war 
goes entirely out of control. 
There are, of course, great difficulties In-
volved In the assumption o! an active role 
by the U.N. with respect to Viet Nam. Two 
of the principal parties concerned-North 
VIet Nam and Oomrnunlst China--for ex-
ample, are not members o! the United Na-
tions. That does not foN!close, however, a 
contribution from the U.N. It has seemed to 
me entirely appropriate that at the very 
least, the U.N. should open Its forum to dis-
cussion of the problem by all Involved di-
rectly or Indirectly In Viet Nam-members 
and nonmembers alike. Such a procedure Is 
proper; lt is precedented; It Is not subject to 
veto. There Is no reason, so far as I can see, 
why the security Council cannot offer to 
bring together not only the member states 
who are most Intimately concerned In the 
situation-that Is, the United States and the 
Soviet Union-but also the non-members, 
that Is, Oommunist China, North Viet Nam, 
the government of South Viet Nam and any 
other group of relevance to a peaceful settle-
ment. I should think, too, that the Security 
Council might also consider requesting the 
International Court of Justice to render an 
advisory opinion on the Geneva Accords of 
1954 and 1962. All of the bell1gerents have 
made reference, from time to time, to these 
Accords as the basis for a peaceful settle-
ment. Certainly, It Is appropriate to try to 
see through the Impartial and judlclow; eyes 
of the Oourt what the appl!cablll ty of these 
agreements may ental! In present circum-
stances. 
Let me make clear that I suggest the pur-
suit of pea.oe through the U.N. Security 
Council not In lieu of prl va te or secret 
diplomacy, not In lieu of a revival o! the 
Geneva Conference. Rather, I suggest It as 
a supplement or precipitant of these ap-
proaches or any other which may hold some 
promise o! a solution. 
As I have noted, the effort has been made 
since the outset to find a pathway to peace 
through secret and traditional diplomacy 
and It has been unsuccoosful. Therefore, I 
think there Is everything to be gained and 
nothing to be 106t at this time by a public 
search before the U.N. !or the gaps between 
the posl tiona of the bell1geren ts and the 
means by which they may be bridged . 
There Is no assurance that a resort to the 
procedural machinery of the United Nations 
will produce any more significant results 
than those yielded by secret and tra.d! tiona! 
diplomacy. That will not be known, however, 
unless and until the approach Is tried. 
Insofar as this nation ls concerned, I can-
not see that we violate our own Interests or 
the Interests of any other nation by a vig-
orous pursuit of peace at the U.N. Ba.•ed on 
the Korean precedents, our government can 
very properly urge upon the Security Ooun-
cll a vote on these two spec!flc resol u tiona 
pertaining to VIetNam: 
One, that the secretary General be in-
structed to Invite governments and groups 
directly and Indirectly Involved In the VIet-
namese confllct, Including China and North 
VIet Nam, to participate before the Council 
In an open and unlimited <llscusslon o! the 
conflict; 
Two, that the security Oouncll request the 
International Court of Justice to render an 
advisory opinion on the current appllcabU!ty 
of the Geneva Accords o! 1954 and 1962 and 
the obligations which these agreements may 
place on th06e directly or Indirectly Involved 
In the Vietnamese contl!ct. 
In closing, may I emphasize that the re-
sponsibility for the conduct of our nation's 
foreign affairs Is vested In the President of 
the United States. Whether we agree with 
him or <llsagree, whether he pleases or dis-
pleases us, will not lighten one Iota the oner-
ous burdens which rest on his shoulders as 
a result of the VIetnamese confllct. The Pres-
Ident may look !or advice to his aides In the 
Executive Branch. He may look to the Sen-
ate and to the people o! this nation. Whether 
or not advice Is forthcoming, whether or not 
there Is consent to his course, the President 
still must decide what he believes to be In 
the best Interests of the Unl ted States. That 
is his responslbU!ty. He cannot share It--
he can only assume It, on behalf o! all o! us. 
The President needs and should have our 
understanding, our help and prayers, and 
the support which can be given to him ln 
good conscience. It ought to be borne In 
mind at all times that whatever contribu-
tion this nation can make to a peaceful set-
tlement In VIet Nam, that contribution can 
only be made and w!ll be made on behalf o! 
all of us, In the end, by the Preslden t o! the 
United States 
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Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, a former 
highly-placed advisor In both the Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations, Mr. Richard 
Goodwin said last night the United States 
has abandoned the policy of seeking a peace-
ful solution In VIetnam, and looks now !or 
a milltary solution, which calls for an un-
cpndltlonal surrender. What Is your answer 
to that, sir? 
Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Martin, I do 
not agree with that statement, and I do not 
think It Is well founded, although I under-
stand and appreciate the motl"CS of Mr. 
Goodwin, a very nice person, In raising the 
question. And, It Is Important that we Jay 
that to rest. The United States position with 
respect to a solution In VIetnam remains 
what It has been consistently since the 
President's speech at Johns Hopkins In April, 
1965. We seek a political solution, not a mili-
tary solution to this conflict. By the same 
token we reject the notion that North VIet-
nam nnd Its allies should have the right 
to Impose a military solution on the situa-
tion. We do not seek the unconditional sur-
render of our adversarlee and that, I repeat, 
Is a constant policy, It hM not changed, It re-
mains the dominating Impulse of the United 
States In this sl tuation. 
ANNOuNCER . From CBS New York, In color, 
Face the Nation, a spontaneous and unre-
hearsed news Interview with United States 
Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur 
Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg will be ques-
tioned by CBS News United Nations Corre-
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Richard c Bott~!et Anne WeUI· 
TU k~ r Ag nee Pranee-P To 1 d 
Ul qu Uonln ben I CB8 Me a Cor· 
r p ndent )b.rUn Acronsky 
r hOJ!OlfSKT, lolr hmb&M&dor, th r wtll 
be con ld ble relief In the country that you 
r w are d~lcat~ aU II t.0 a ~acerut aolu-
tlon 'enrthel , &11 the alrns aeem t.0 be, 
Ide !rom fr Gooelwln'a remaru that Gen-
ral Wr unordand came here t.O •~It extra 
troops th t he will If t them that we are 
er.route t.O a policy or cecal a tlon or thla war 
ant1 th~re Ia ce.rtalnly no algn or any eacAia· 
tlon o! our diplomatic etrort.. t.0 aeelt peace 
hmb dor GoLoanc Well, M rtln, I 
think that diplomatic errorta cannot atwaya 
be public I wlll aay t.O you, and I will a&y t.0 
the American people, that our diplomatic 
e!forta are unremlttlnr and are pur ued with 
the aame vigor that the war Ia being pur-
au d . We are In a great conl!lct We cannot 
terminate the conl!.lct by ouraelvea Any con-
ntct requtrea agreement on both part& t.0 
terminate the con!Uct. But, we aeelt a peace-
ful aolutlon, not ~ace at any price but an 
hOnorable solution through diplomatic re-
source• and every day at the UN !La my col-
le~guea here and at the UN know, Mr 
Hottelet, Mlq Tuckerman, we pursue this, 
we make proi>M. t do not recall a single day 
In he two years alm<>&t that I have been at 
the UN where we have not had conversatlon.a 
on that aubject Those conversations &till 
continue here at UN New York and I thlnlt 
they continue In many capital& In thP world 
where we have representation, and our ad· 
versarlf'a have repre!~nta ton 
Mlaa W~trLL·TucKD><AN Mr. hmba&aador, 
I understand that you are planning t.0 go t.O 
Geneva during the Pacem In Terris Confer-
ence at the end o! thta month . U Thant, the 
S~retary-General ot the UN, will be ~here 
and alao, I believe, the repreaent.'ltlvea or 
H~nol t.nd maybe the FLN, the VIet Cong 
Now, ta tha~ ao, do you have such a plan, t.nd 
tt you do, do you Intend to seck contact with 
~;he Hanoi and FLN people? 
AmbM&ador GOLDBltRC . Well , Anne, part or 
the dtmculty here Ia that lt you aay aometblng 
like thla you raise !alae hopes. When I anld 
we pursue the path or peaceful settlement, I 
would not want to create anr false Impres-
sion that a settlement Is In the omng I have 
been Invited t.O go t.O Gene\ a . t have said, aa 
I have aald to many groups In this country 
and aw y !rom this country, thnt I &hall be 
\Cry glad t.0 go and state our poaltlon , It It 
Is at a.ll poaalble, consistent with the work 
we have to do In New York You know we have 
some unnntahed business In New York, we 
are not nnlahed with thla special sesalon I 
am no~ awnre that our adversaries have 
agreed to be there, and I would not Uke t.O 
ere te the Impression that something fresh 
ta In the works. I shall , I hope, be there I 
have some other bustneaa In Europe. I shall 
state the position or the United States, but 
the Important thing Is thl&-we are n CJt Incit-
Ing tn potnta or contact, It there Is a mutual 
wllllngnesa to conduct a dialogue which I 
rtg rd t.0 be tndlapen~able t.O ~ttle this con-
ftlct No conntct can be settled , whether It Ia 
domeatlc, aa I know rrom my ell])ertence, or 
International without a dialogue, "'lthout a 
di.acua&lon, without a willingness on both 
p rLI t.O exchange point& or vtew 
Mr HoTT&LET. Mr Arnbluisador , there Is a 
dialogue In the United States right n ow o>er 
the me ulng or thla v.ar, Ita nature and Ita 
~nd and It haa been 118.ld that the dluent 
v.hlch haa been voiced sometlme.s •ul loudly 
and forcefully, Ia a complicating factor 
v.hlch put& oii an end an honorabl end t.0 
t le r Do )OU reel that aome limit& o r re-
' n s lblUty, aa •cme pecJl' advocate &hould 
1.. t • t to thla dlMenl? 
Thla Is Dick an old 
My own reeling Ia 
\Cn' ample I atat~ It aa a Juauc or the 
Su, 1 m Court 1 ha-e n c.t chan ed my mind 
use I took otr the robe Dl.aac!nt Ia all 1m· 
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pcwtan part or th Am :1 
not~ n e wtth the ata 
n made t.nd I upr a 
VIew, that di.IMnt ~man be rNPOnalbJe..• 
Obvtouaty, all or ua uld lilt~ dtaaent t.0 bt 
...,.ponalble but who 1.1 t.0 d l!n "r pon· 
atble?" It Ia out or the exellan e or .-lewa that 
we can a.rrtve at a right declaton The Gov-
ernment. and t apeak ror the ao ... emment at 
the UN, believes that It hu made the right 
declalona, but a democracr ntalla the right 
or anybOdy t.0 dSsaent. whether It 1.1 r pon-
atble or no Now, hat doea net m an that 
any cl l:1."n haa a right to enga In Illegal 
activity That 1.1 a dltrerent matter What Ia 
oont..rnrr t.O law Ia not the type or dlaaent 
contemplated by the First Amendment The 
First hmendment contemplate& tree dbcw-
aton It Ia only by tree dtacuMIOo we can ar-
:1ve at correct declalona, and r don t think 
that ta a algn or wea.ltneaa, I think It Ia a algn 
ot strength and It Ia really what we are fight· 
lng about In VIetnam, that the people should 
have a right t.O expreaa themaelvea, and a 
right t.0 arrive at their own declalona, free 
from Coree. free trom violence, by the cru lble 
or tree dlacusa.lon. 
Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambaaaador--
Mr. Harrnrr. Congreaamen H~b~rt. ot 
Loulalana on Friday auggeat~ that the Firat 
hmendment be eet aside, you wouldn't agree? 
Amba&aadot GOLDBE&G, No, I don't f4P'I<I 
wl th that. I am not aware or that statement 
and I don't like t.O quarrel with Congreaa-
men, It's not diplomatic Cor me t.O do so. 
But, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, talk.lng about the Civil War alld at 
a time o! OW' greatest travail, aald In ll:x 
Parte Milliken, and It waa dlrec~ at Abra· 
ham Lincoln, our great President, "The Con· 
atltutlon or the United State& holda under 
the mantle or tt.. protection all cttt.:.ena In 
time or war a.s well a.s In time or peace It 
Ia not written t.0 be relinquish~ becau e we 
are In a war and In a ~rlod ot grave con-
filet." I believe profoundly In that. 
?-.1r. AoaoNSKT. You would not under any 
ctrcurn11tances then equate dlaaent with a 
Io.ck ot patriotism? 
Ambaaaador GoLDBERC, Oh, no. That Ia a 
danger we muat obviously avoid We went 
through a grueling experience during the 
McCarthy period . I would regard It t.0 be a 
horrendous day tor our country If, because 
or the grave conltlct we are In, that there 
should be any resurrection of McCarthyl.sm 
In this country. Dissent Ia not t.0 be equated 
"'lth disloyalty There are many people who 
&tncerely question our motives and pollcl.,.. 
Now. then. we can defend them Govern-
ment 11M the right or free •peech, t.0o Thla 
program Is an Illustration or l.hls. I don't 
lind any dl!llculty In having tnvltatlona to 
present the Government point or vtew. the 
Administration point ot view t.O the Amer-
Ican people. My dlmculty Is getting too mnny 
Invitations. So the Government. we must 
recognize that government does have the 
right or tree speech ju! t a.s a c itizen does, 
but that ta part or the American schem~ 
Ml.sa WoLL·TucKEilMAN Mr Amh aaad or 
r ou 
Mr. Acmo. KT. Go ah d Ml Tucker-
man 
MISS WULL· TUCK£RNAN YOU b a \e aa.ld 
earlier hat the Unit~ Statea docs not aeel< 
uncondttlon 1 aurrender cr the adv rsary 
Yet, AmeriC&D omct ls say conatantl y that 
the U Will continue nghtlng unUI t.he ag· 
gr ton 1.s stopp~ Then they &af v.e wv.nt 
t.O negotiate Well what Ia here t.0 negotiate 
about, I! thta Ia the poatuon or he Un ited 
States? 
Ambllo64ador Got.oana Well, Ann e there 
ta a 11reat deal t.0 negotiate about n t o t all 
the war hu t.O continue until there Ia a 
acttlemen t or the war, and the ract t hat the 
r g on d not ~ n tha t the I 
o r the war Ia unconcUUonal surrend er There 
han been wara when t.h t hu been the ool 
In Wor d Wu U , the d tl.n~ oal Ule 
wu the unconc11U &1 • 
0 y and Japa.n t .. not 
r Ulta oonlU t Qutte U contrary AI 
r1!!ll er, 1 ata~ In pi.Un r th• 
Ckne.-&1 bl y wbn are th lfO&l- ot Ute 
United Sta and they r~ •hat the 
Preal.den aald a BaiU ore, and they are 
atlll the go&Ia We do not It uncondiUonal 
aurrendar or N rth \.,ewu.m We do n ~It 
that they ahould chan e their •> • m We 
are r&lll!y 1.0 negottata a IuUon ot t.ht oon-
ntct We do not elt to tm a policy ot 
non-•H nno.e::.t.-ef al!anmrnt on 1J1e GO\"• 
ernment ot South Vlet.nam We are r dy that 
the:; ahould be nonaligned , l! that ta l.helr 
desire Our objective ta a almple one We 
cit ror them the people eor the Sou h , the 
right t.0 determine their o.,.·n d•Uny, tr.e 
rrom forte and rree from rcton 
Now, those are conttnulnr oala. The1 art 
far dltTerent !rom a ayatem where you aay 
the way t.O acttle thla war ta !or you t.0 
ma.rcll up and surrender t.O th American 
P'orces 1 aee a great dltrerence In that But 
we cannot aettle the war by oul'lt'lvea Two 
p:trttes must aettle the war. 
Mr ACRON11KT, Mr hmbaaaador, there Ia 
gre t concern In the country, and through-
out the world at the Inability o! thla Ad· 
mtnlatratton t.0 settle the war, and Senat.Or 
Aiken , ot Vermont, a.!ter the laauance of 
that White Paper by the Senata Republican 
Polley Committee, aatd he didn't feel thla 
Administration could settle the war, that It 
would take a Republican Admtntatratton 
t don't think Aiken waa really apeaktna 
only to political tenna. He really teela that 
this Administration hu arrived at a point 
ot Impotence In trying t.O aettle thla war. 
Would yo u agree: or courae you won' ? 
Am~ador GOLDBDO. Well, !!rat O! all , I 
ought t.0 con!esa aome prejudtcaa In the 
matter. I am a great admlrer O! Senat.Or 
Aiken I regard him to be one or !.he very 
great Senat.Ora In the United State& Senate. 
Secondly, when I took my aeat on the Su-
preme Court, I got out or polltlca and, de-
aptte what you may read about In the preaa 
and so on r am not going t.O re-enter the 
neld or pollttca. 
Thirdly, I regard thla sx-t or mine to be 
completely t.0 be non-political. I a~ak ror 
all ot the American people. t apeak tor the 
Government, but I a~ak !or a!! or !.he 
hmerlcan people. 
So that I do not enter. and would not 
enter, tnt.O thla queatlon or Republican or 
Democratic poelttona. I don't thlnlt Senat.Or 
Aiken speaks politically, I huten t.O add . 
Now, every Admlnl~tratlon , Republican or 
Democratic, repreBenttng the American peo-
ple, will have t.0 try t.O nnd an honorable 
solution to thla war. 
I believe that all or our people, and every-
body In all or our polltlcal parties, regardleaa 
ot their approach t.O the problem. want an 
h onorllble settlement, and the queatton Ia : 
how do you nnd It? 
I think our ad,erurtes are pretty reallattc 
I think that they know that the American 
people wlll suppert their Government In the 
attempt 1.0 nnd a n honorkble aolutlon to the 
r, and tr they canno t lind an honorable 
aolutlon will auppert their Oo'ernment In 
the pursUit C f the Wilt, and therefore thla 
Government, this Admlnlatratlon, muat try 
to nnd a solution and It hu the aame prob-
lem thnt any admlnhtratlon will nnd, the 
o her aide muat Join It In Ita objective, and 
Ulat h.U been p rt or the dtl!iculty, We can-
not get a dialogue cotn~r. m ny attempLI h&tt 
h n made to try and get a dialogue iOIOII 
that wlll brlr. about a concrete dbcu ton-
hen.· Is this wa.r t.0 be bruugh t t.O an honcr-
ablo end? T h us rar "'e haven t b~n aucceu-
tul but we hue t.0 ~r uere. 
Mr Ho1TU..rr Mr Ambaaaador, I would lllr.P 
t.O harken b ck 1.0 an rl!er point In your 
career You know u much about labor rela· 
t na aa anyone In th United Sta ea 
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There Is a great deal of controversy, too, 
and a great clash of Interest between labor 
and management, In which the Government 
Is having to Intrude more than it has ever 
done. 
Do you think that, looking over the field 
with the collapse of a newspaper In New 
York, largely because of union pressure; with 
the automobile Industry facing Vf!rY serious 
contractual negotiations with the mattf!r of 
the rallroad strike; do you think that the 
tlme ls right for a whole new look at the In-
stitution of collective bargaining: 
Ambassador GoLDBERG. Well, Dick. I am an 
ex-expert in the subject, If I ever was an 
expert. I constantly must seek new looks, but 
I doubt very much whether there are any 
magic solutions about major conflicts, just 
as I doubt that whether by the wave of a 
wand, which we would all like to find, a 
magic wand, we can get this contllct In VIet-
nam over. 
In our domestic area we have a great prob-
lem. We would like labor confilcts to subside. 
We would like them to be all solved, but 
would also like to preserve our freedom Now, 
all of the solutions to the grave labor con-
filets Involve trying to find a way to solve 
the problems and maintain freedom. This Is 
not easy to do, whether It Is newspapers In 
New York; whether It Is the railroads, so I 
suggest tha.t we don't do badly In our domes-
tic scene, by and large, we get together settle 
oon!llct, as you know, since you are also In-
volved recently, that was settled. We had 
some problems on the television Industry . I 
think that the railroad conflict wtll l:ie set-
tled. I believe It ought to be. 
I wish, I wtsh In the ln ternatlonal scene 
that we were as successful M we are In the 
domestic scene, when we have a grave 
con!llct. 
It Is much-! can testify by personal ex-
perience now, In two years, lit Is much more 
dlmcult to settle basic contllcts Interna-
tionally than domestically for a very simple 
reason--<iomestlcally, whatever our differ-
ences, we all serve the same goals and believe 
In them; Internationally, we have wide 
divergencies o! goals, objectives, methods, 
and that presents us with a great problem. 
Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, let's return 
you to the area of your oompetence ln the 
United Nations. Why don't we use the UN 
to seek peace In VIetnam? 
Ambassador GoLDBERG. Well, Martin, we 
have tried; I believe, and one of the reasons 
I accepted my present post, Is I believe 
strongly that the UN. after all, we are the 
principal architects of the UN, Franklin 
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were the 
architects, I believe the UN must play a role 
In preserving peace and security In the M>rld. 
Mr. AGRONSKY. Why don't we use It for 
that purpose? 
Ambassador GOLDBERG. Now, we have tried. 
we brought the-the first efl'ort I made 
when I carne down here was to try to Involve 
the UN In finding a way to a peaceful settle-
ment. As a matter of fact, It has been for-
gotten In all of the historical recitations. 
Quite early after I came down, In August of 
1965, I brought a letter from the President 
encouraging the Secretary Gen!!ral to renew 
his activity ln this area. He had made prior 
efforts that were unsuccessful, I don't want 
to go Into the details of that. It has never 
been published, but I would !Ike to report 
that In August, 1965, an efl'ort was made by 
the Secretary General, we were cooperative, 
the adversaries were not. 
Now, after that, we brought the matter 
officially to the UN In late January, 1966, and 
we met opposition to that. We met It by the 
Soviet Union, we met It by France, and we 
had a debate, we Inscribed It on the agenda, 
we could not pursue It because Implicit was a. 
veto threat that If we dld, the effort of the 
UN would be vetoed. 
Just the other day, I said at the General 
A.o;..,embly that 1! the Soviet Union would 
withdraw Its objection, we could go to the 
Security CouncU tomorrow and take up what 
the UN might do to bring about peace. 
Mr. AGaONSKY. Old you say that to the So-
viet representative? 
Ambassador GOLDBERG Yes, I did. 
Mr. AGRONSKY. Well. what did he say? 
Ambassador GOLDB!:RG. Well, he a.ald the UN 
hasn't got competence to deal with this sub-
ject. I don't agree with him. 
Miss WEILL-TuCKERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, 
when you brought the question to the Se-
curity Oouncll In January, '66, the same day. 
simultaneously came the announcement of 
the resumption of the bombing. This, of 
course, created a certain type of Impression 
that maybe was not too favorable tor a 
dispute. 
In the same way you have, I believe, re-
cently, you, yourself accepted the latest plan 
of the Secretary General U Thant which calls 
for a cease-fire, stand-still truce, and General 
Westmoreland a few weeks later said that a 
cease-fire was not In the Interest of the 
United States. Now, how do you resolve these 
contradictions and the credibility gap that 
has developed at the UN and anywhere else? 
Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Anne, you 
have asked about ft ve q uestlons so I will 
try to answer them In sequence. First, when 
we carne In January, 1966, that was not my 
first effort to bring lt to the UN. I was per-
fectly willing, on behalf of the United States. 
to bring It In August. 1965, when that sit-
uation dld not exist. I was quite ready to 
bring It during the bombing pause of Decem-
ber-January, December, 1965, January, 1966. 
Why did I not do so at that time? 
Because everybody that I consulted down 
here said-now, this Is not a good tlme to 
bring It to the UN because there Is under-
way a diplomatic effort. This might Interfere 
with the effort. I consulted very broadly, and 
finally, when we brought It at the tlme we 
did, we had exhausted the posslblllty of ar-
riving at a diplomatic solution during the 
bombing pause. and I recommended to the 
President, let us bring It, because It seems 
to me that everybody says, no good tlme 
exists for bringing lt. Now, about a cease-fire 
and the Secretary General's suggestion. The 
official response of the United States, the 
official-now, we are not going to-we talk 
about free speech, we are not going to pre-
vent officials of the American Government, 
we are not a monolithic government, and 
If the President stopped General Westmore-
land from expressing his sincere convictions, 
there would be a. great outcry In the press 
and on television that we are gagging the 
General The official position of the United 
States was given ln an official letter which 
I wrote and delivered to the Secretary Gen-
eral, with the approval o! the Government 
at the highest levels, In which we said: 
1. You propose a cease-fire, we are agree-
able. All we suggest, and I think quite rightly, 
Is that we have some conversations because 
a cease-fire must be an effective cease-fire, 
not that that means that every little bit of 
shooting wlll stop, but you have to arrange 
when will It take effect; how wtll armies dis-
engage. We have practical things to do. 
Second, so that remains the position We 
are for a. mutual cease-fire, and we are 
ready today to talk about the modal! ties of 
such a cease-fire. That Is the position of the 
United States Government. 
Now, there are difficulties, as General 
Westmoreland, he Is a soldier, properly 
pointed out. But the official position of 
the United States Government Is, we are !or 
a cease-firf' 
Mr. AGRONSKY. How do you explain there-
fusal of the Soviet Union to permit the dis-
cussion of the VIetnam problem In the 
United Nations? 
Ambassador Gor.onrnc . Well, that Is a very 
troublesome thing. I wish the Soviet Union 
would join the United States In putting Its 
full force behind working out an honorable 
solution to VIetnam. I think It Is In their 
Interest. I think It Is In our Interest. We 
are the two largest world powers. The greater 
the power, the greater the responsibility to 
trv to work out world peace and worlcl 
S<·curity 
Now. how do you explain their attitude' 
They say they want a peace, we say we want 
peace; they say they want the Geneva Ac-
cords Implemented, we say we want the 
Geneva Accords Implemented. Then we fall 
npart. 
We fall apart because we say anybody, you, 
should do something about lt. You are a co-
Chairman of the Geneva Conference, If you 
don't agree that the UN Is the place, join 
Prime Minister Wilson. reconvene the Con-
ference, we will be there. We are ready to 
do It, we are ready to say that we ought to 
reaffirm the Geneva Accords. 
Mr. AGRONSKY. How do they answer that' 
Ambassador GoLDBERG. I think their answer 
is this, and it Is not a satisfactory answer by 
our likes. They say that we support the pro-
gram of Hanoi In this matter. Hanoi has 
said we do not recognize the competence of 
the UN, we do not believe It Is necessary to go 
to Geneva. All that Is necessary to do Is for 
the Americans to get out and there will be 
peace In that part of the world. 
Now, that Is not so. 
Mr. AGRONSKY. Why dO we keep saying to 
ourselves and Indicating, as you do. and as 
all American officials do. that the Russians 
want peace In VIetnam? Yet, the Russians 
have continually stated that they will supply 
Hanoi with all of the help that they possibly 
can. 
There Is a fundamental contradiction here. 
How do you explain that? 
Ambassador GoLDBERG Martin. there Is 
a contradiction and we cannot resolve that 
contradiction. And. I do not say that we 
support what they do, quite the contrary. 
I would hope that the Soviets would resolve 
this contradiction In their own policy be-
cause I don't believe that that policy Is con-
ductive to peace. I would hope that they 
would really come to terrns and use their 
Influence as they dld In Laos In 1962, to 
bring about a resolution of that particular 
problem that I know about. because I was 
In President Kennedy's Cabinet, which was 
not satisfactorily resolved because lt has 
not been honored by the Pathet Lao and the 
Communists, but at least we brought about 
a solution. 
I would hope they would do the same. 
On the other hand, because we cannot 
persuade them to do the same, that does not 
mean we should not try In other areas to try 
to bring about an accommodation of point 
of views. 
As a matter of fact, every time we bring 
about an accommodation of point of views 
In other areas, space, counsular treaty, nu-
clear nonprollfieratlon, we Illustrate the In-
consistency of their policy because here we 
are pursuing the paths of getting along. try-
Ing to minimize the area of conflict and we 
have an area where the conflict exists. We 
think they are Inconsistent not the United 
States--
Mr HOTrELET. But this approach toward 
agreement seems to have ground to a stop 
now, because the negotiations on the an tl-
balllstlc missiles system, the negotiations on 
the Treaty to ~an the Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons seem to be at least In trouble, 1f 
not broken down altogether 
Ambassadar GOLDBERG. No, Dick, I don't 
quite agree with that. It Is not easy to find 
accommodation, as I discovered when I was 
In charge of our team that negotiated the 
Space Treaty 
On the other hand, we made some signifi-
cant steps this year. We have the air agree-
ment, and while we have some technical 
problems, I think we will resolve them. We 
did agree upon the Space Treaty. We did 
agree upon the Consular Treaty. 
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·ow. we hav raufted Ulem, by tlle y, 
and 1 am YUJ proud or our OOI.Ultry, that we 
•ere among the ftrat.. Naw we upect and 
an dpate Ul&~ Ule ~let Union will ratify 
tbem 
It 1a now up to Ulem 
l'\ow, on nu 1 r proll!eratlon. ~e ar ID 
n"ruaaUona and we have some problems 
•11.h our own alllea, we are ll")1ng to r....alve 
them 1 notice Mr Poo;ter hall gone to 1okyo 
It Ia natural that we should ha\'e to explain 
and make aure that all points or view are 
presentoo, ao I don t agrre that th~y have 
come to an end. 
lr. AGROI< KT, Well, we have run out of 
ttme, unfortunately, Mr. AmbasSador. I wish 
)OU could have concluded by l~JIIng u.s of a 
new spec~nc peace bid In which you nre 
operatlu , but apparently, &.II you aay, Its 
alwaya going on. Thank )OU Vel")' much for 
bt'lng here to Face the Nation 
Ambaasndor OoLDBEkC Thank you, l\larUn 
ANI<OUNCI'Jl Today, on Face the Nation, 
Unl~ States Amba.au.dor to t.he United Na-
tlona Arthur Goldberg wa.s lnt.en·lewed by 
DS r>ewa United Natlona Corr pond~nt 
Richard C. Hottelet, Anne Weiii-Tuckennan 
or Agence France-Presse. CDS News Corres-
pondent MA.rtln Agronsky led the question-
Ing Next week, another prominent figure In 
the news will Face the Nation . 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I 
join with the distinguished maJOrity 
leader, the senior Senator from Montana, 
in his recommendation. 
I agree with him that the hour Is 
growing late. During thc~c last 2 or 3 
weeks, particularly since General West-
moreland was here, I feel that there has 
been an Increase In tension not only In 
this country, but also between this coun-
try and Russia. We have noted the Inci-
dents that occurred in the Sea of Japan . 
They do not seem to be so important In 
and of themselves. However, I think they 
arc symptomatic of a ncrvous1.ess which 
could lead to world war III. 
I think the mention In the nc\\<papers 
recently of the Prt>sidcnt's own thought 
almost a year ago about the possibility of 
this war leading to world war III Is very 
om.lnous. I think that the .situation ccr-
ta.l.nly warrants the recommendation 
that has been made by the Senator from 
Montana. 
I join with him in that reccmmenda-
tlon. I also take this opportunity to pay 
my respects to the Senator from Oregon 
who, I believe, was the first Member of 
the Senate, that I can recall, who so 
stronclv recommended early In the con-
flict that It be taken to the United 
Nations. 
I think It is quite correct thnt we rec-
ognize his forcs!~tht m that connection. 
I wish I could think of something that 
could give 1mpetus to this idea. 
I am afraid I do not sec much Inclina-
tion on the part of the E.xecutlvc to move 
111 this direction, however. There seems 
to ha\ e den· loped a feeling that notlung 
can be done either m or out of the Uni ed 
Nations and that we are now followmg 
an all-out military cour e. 
I hope that feeling Is not so and that 
th r ommendatlons of the Senator 
from • tontana wUJ be taken rlously. 
I con ratulatc him for h s \'cry etrec-
\ statement. 
lr lANSFIELD Mr. Pr !d nt, I 
thank U1c Senator. I hope that his fore-
bod1n 1s not correct, beca the Ume 
1s etUng pretty &hart 
I hope that v. v.ill refer this matter 
to the U • .. an organiza.Uon v.hlch, 1n 
my opinion, has no met Its rcsponslbll-
lty from the very beginning of this con-
flict, and that 1f the Unll.<'d Nations docs 
face up to lh1s matter and a call is I ('(! 
to the VIetcong, the North VIetnam e, 
the Chln~P. and others to come to the 
conference table, that we v. !II be prcpart'd 
to accept the \erdict of the Unll.<'d Na-
tions 1n that instance, \\hatc\cr It mny 
be. 
Mr. President, I yield to the dlstin-
~lshcd Senator from Vermont. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. Pr 1dcnt, \\e hav 
this afternoon had two proposals mad to 
the Senate, each hopefully looking e1llwr 
to the dccscalat!on or th<' ending of thl' 
war in Southeast Asia 
The Senator from Kentucky !Mr. 
CooPER] recommended decsealatlng the 
war without In any way abdicating any 
r<'Spons!bil!ty that we mlght have In 
South VIetnam . 
The Senator from Montana [Mr. 
M~NSFIELol, recommended that we make 
an effort to reach some solution through 
the United Nations. 
These two proposals arc not lncom-
pntJblc. They can both be tned out at 
the same time, and I hope that they wtll 
be 
The original purpose of the United Na-
tions, one of the main purpo. cs of the 
United Nations, was to find a way in 
v.:hich to settle dissention among the na-
tions without resorting to war. 
It has been successful in a small way, 
but only where the two parties to the 
controversy have both been looking for 
n way out. 
It so happens that a long time ago, well 
over a year ago, our Ambassador to the 
United Nations submitted a proposal to 
the Security Council for Intervening In 
or at least taking notice of the situation 
in South Vietnam. As yet, nothing has 
been done. 
I believe the United Nations Ls in a 
position where 1t must--as we say ln 
Yankee Land-"cut bait or fish" if it Is 
going to be an ctrective organiZation. If 
it proves that. it cannot be an effective 
and efficient organization, 1l can at least 
make an effort. 
The United States cannot be the pohcc-
man for the whole world, and the trouble 
we arc having In one very small part of 
that world indicates that we could not 
posstbly police the entire world even If 
"e attempted to do so. 
I hope that the President will Instruct 
Ambassador Goldberg to lru !st. that the 
Security Council take some action If the 
Security Councll rcruS<'s to take any ac-
tion, we will then know v.ho wants war 
and who does not. '\'\ant war In this v.orld 
of ours. 
If any of the the maJor nations, the 
five nations holding veto pov.er on the 
Security Councll, undertake to veto any 
effort at all, then U1ey must take the 
rcspons!bll!ly for cont1nu1ng au cnla-
tlon of the war In the world It is hard 
to bellcvc that they v.ill do that, butlt I 
possible 
I am not. sure that any of the plans or 
proposaL~ sutmltted to us today v.ill work. 
but we would certainly be negligent 1l we 
And 1t t.h ri tJ 
• · Uona do un-
rc In the orld. 
v.hich th orl.gin I purpo or lh 
on;nnlzaUon-t.o mntntain pe ce In th 
v.orld nd U1 •t come forT rd v. !Ul a 
solution, eH n thou hIlls not 100 pcrcem 
v. hat t.h United Stat wan , I hope 
that the Pr I dent wIll tlt ton~ pt It 
It is high lm no t.h t we find ou 
v.ho really Is promoUn thl v. r In 
Southeast Asia and v.ho really wan to 
maintain pc cc ln the v.orld 
I bel!e\·e that other countrl<' b d 
the United Sta will br. In a pos!t.!on 
w hc1 e the rc p n lblllty v. ill rest upon 
thr!r shoulctrrs If we do not achieve any 
favorable re ult at all In the v. ~· of 
bringing the world to pcarc nca!n I ho1 
that Pre !dent Johnson v.lll not. he hale 
to direct Ambn actor Goldbrrg to Ins! t 
upon action by the United Nations so 
that we may know once nnd for all "ho 
the real promoters of the wnr In the 
world arc. 
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. Pr !dent, I 
thank the disl!ngu! hcd Senator from 
Vermont. 
Mr PELL. Mr. President, will he Sen-
ator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr PELL. Mr. President, I oclatc 
myself with the view of the majority 
leader. the di t!ngulshed Senator !rom 
Montana. I congratulate him on his 
speech. 
The basic reef upon which ncgollatlons 
betwe-en us, the NLF and the North VJCt-
namr~e founder is that our advrrar!C$ do 
not bel!cYc that we will a.::ccpt a govPrn-
mt>nt that rcpre cnts all the various fac-
tions of that unhappy country, South 
VIetnam. 
I think If the sugge tlons made todny 
were presenl.<'d to a United Nations or 
Security Council conference-or to any 
other conference-within the next few 
weeks and we agreed to accept the Tec-
ommendalions coming from It, a great 
deal could thus be done to clcnr the air. 
I believe the Senator from Montana 
has put his finger on the sticking point 
when he said that he hoped we would 
accept with good grace wha~ver the re-
sults of the conference were. 
We did not accept with grood graPe the 
results of the Geneva Conference. We 
have usually been opposed to going to a 
conference and agn:c!ng to accept th,., 
result. I think we wIll hnve to publicly 
agree to accept the result.~ bl•fore going 
Into a conference. I hope that we "'Ill do 
so. 
I thank the dl tlngu! hed S nato1 from 
Montana 
Mr. MANSF IEI.D. r Pr !den , I 
yield to the di n ulshcd Senator from 
Kansas 
Mr. CARh<;ON Mr Pr sld nt,1t ems 
to me that Monday, May 15, may be a 
mcmorabl day In our VI nam war. 
T~~oo outstanding addr have been 
delivere-d In the Senate, one by the dis-
tinguished maJority lead!:!r, th othr.r by 
the able Senator !rom Kentucky I fr 
Coorr.R I, in regard to the concern of c!t.i-
7.ens about our 5lt.uatlon In VI tnam I 
bcheve th t t.hc cxpr ons In the Senate 
today sp k of the unrest In th 'at!on 
H ts prevalent v ryv.h r on g I 
sincerely hope t.hnt t.he dmlnl trat!on 
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v.rill give every consideration to the mes-
sages that have been given in the Senate 
this afternoon. 
I notice that several members of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations are in 
the Chamber. We all remember the ex-
tended and strenuous efforts on the part 
of the distinguished Senator from Ore-
gon [Mr. MoasEJ, In our executive ses-
sions, In regard to presenting this matter 
to the United Nations. I do not believe I 
speak out of turn when I mention that 
we have had Secretary Rusk before us on 
several occasions and have Instructed 
him to go to the United Nations and urge 
that they take action 
We have had Ambassador Goldberg 
before our committee and have expressed 
to him the importance of this situation 
being taken over by the United Nations. 
So I say today that this war will be 
settled at a conference table. and I sin-
cerely hope that it will be settled soon. 
The messages delivered In the Senate 
today, which speak the minds and the 
feelings of Members of this great body, 
should reach not only our Nation's Capi-
tal, and the President's office Itself, but 
the United Nations and other countries 
as well. 
I sincerely hope that every considera-
tion w!ll be given to these outstanding 
and able messages by Senators who are 
familiar with and have studied the Inter-
national problem that has been expressed 
in the Senate this afternoon. 
I commend the distinguished majority 
leader. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
thank the distinguished Senator from 
Kansas for his kind remarks. 
I did not note that those who are on 
the floor this afternoon all happen to be 
members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, in some form or other. 
I yield to the Senator from Oregon. 
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the sig-
nificance of the speech just delivered by 
the majority leader is very great. The 
significance is so great that I believe 
I violate no privilege by making the pre-
diction that we will be coming back to 
this speech In the months ahead. I be-
lieve the speech outlines one of our last 
best hopes for trying to resolve the war 
in Vietnam on an honorable basis. It 
offers that hope to the world without 
leading to a dangerous escalation that 
may involve many of the countries with 
whom we are now pleading for diplo-
matic assistance Into World War III. 
The Mansfield speech really pleacls for 
resolving the war through existing peace 
keeping procedures of international law. 
I am in the presence of the majority 
leader, the chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, and the Senator 
from Vermont, who have been my lead-
ers and my teachers in many aspects of 
this troubled foreign policy area. I be-
lieve the Mansfield report of the fall of 
1965, In which the Senator from Ver-
mont !Mr. AIKEN] and the others of that 
commission Joined, paved the way for 
the discussion that we are engaged in 
this afternoon. 
The Senator from ArkallSM [Mr. FUI.-
BRIGHT) time and time again, as chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, has pleaded with and has sought 
to involve the State Department in ra-
tional discussion of the desirability of 
making use of existing peacekeeping 
procedures, of the United Nations 
charter and of other treaties under which 
we are committed. 
I believe the Senator from Montana 
this afternoon has well served the best 
interests of our country in this partic-
ular hour, in making a plea again that 
our Government should seek official re-
sort to the terms and articles of the 
United Nations. But that is not the only 
recourse open to our Government. 
Comments have been made concerning 
my long interest in this matter. I appre-
ciate the references which have been 
made to my consistent plans for the last 
3 or more years that the administration 
should insist that the United Nations 
should take jurisdiction over the threat 
to the peace of the world which has de-
veloped in Southast Asia. The majority 
leader, the chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, the Senator from 
Vermont, have been very kind to allude 
to my record In this request and I thank 
them very much. The Senator from Kan-
sas [Mr. CARLSON] and I have had dis-
cussions about the desirability of having 
the United Nations intervene in this war 
by exercising its rightful jurisdiction un-
der the charter. More than 2 years ago, 
at the President's request, I prepared two 
legal memoranda for him on the subject 
of our dealing with the international law 
aspects of this problem through the 
United Nations Charter. The second 
memorandum set forth a series of specific 
resolutions that the President had asked 
me to draft, which would conform to the 
existing peacekeeping procedures of the 
charter. 
The majority leader knows that of re-
cent date those memoranda again were 
discussed. They became of current im-
portance and were the subject of some 
consideration in an exchange of views 
with some officials within the adminis-
tration. 
I wish to stress that many people who 
are now saying that the United Nations 
cannot be of help and that the United 
Nations is useless have not taken the 
time to study what the obligations of the 
members of the United Nations really are 
under the charter. 
One of the propooals I have urged, and 
urge again this afternoon-the only one 
I can speek about publicly, because it is 
the only one that has become public from 
other sources-is that some consideration 
be given by the Security Council to re-
ferring the whole matter to the General 
Assembly, Yes, I would add that con-
sideration should be given by the Security 
Council to even recommending and ex-
panding of the membership of the 
Geneva Conference as a suitable format 
for trying to aid the combatants to reach 
an honorable negotiated settlement. Such 
a format would not necessarily exclude 
the Security Council from a participat-
ing party to the negotiations. 
One of the arguments you hear is that 
China, North Vietnam, and the VIetcong 
do not belong to the United Nations. 0! 
course, the commitment under the United 
Nations is not that peace will be enforced 
only between members. The United Na-
tions Charter places the obligation upon 
the members signatory thereto to enforce 
the peace, to prevent a threat to the peace 
against any country in the world or any 
combination of countries in the world-
members or nonmembers-that threat-
ens peace. That just happens to be the 
international law commitment of the 
signatories to the United Nations 
Charter. 
I believe the Senator from Vermont 
was correct when, a few moments ago, 
he pointed out what the primary purpose 
of the charter is. The United Nations 
was formed to enforce the peace, to pre-
vent a threat to the peace, Any other 
program of the United Nations that has 
subsequently developed is ancillary to 
that primary obligation. I! the signa-
tories are not willing to move to enforce 
the peace, then the United Nations 
Charter is truly a scrap of paper. If sig-
natories to a treaty are not willing to 
carry out their obligations under the 
treaty, they have turned it into a scrap of 
paper. 
Therefore, the possibilities of a settle-
mei't of this war through recourse to 
these peacekeeping procedures, which 
now have been given the standi,ng of In-
ternational law obligations by the signa-
tories to the charter, are manifold. 
The general tendency In the Senate is 
to assume that the Security Council will 
have to enforce the peace and negotiate a 
settlement if the Security Council de-
cides to take jurisdiction. That does not 
follow at all. The Security Council has 
the jurisdiction under the charter to ex-
ercise such an authority If it should de-
cide to so act. 
However, the Security Council has wide 
latitude in working out procedural solu-
tions for the handling of the war. It may 
decide to call upon the General Assembly 
to cooperate with the Security Council 
by making use of the procedures of the 
General Assembly, as well as the Secu-
rity Council. Furthermore, I would like 
to suggest that the Security Council give 
very careful consideration to the possi-
bility of exPanding the membership of 
the Geneva Conference. An enlarged Ge-
neva Conference might prove to be a very 
effective international instrumentality 
for helping reach an honorable settle-
ment of the war in Vietnam. 
I said on the floor of the Senate the 
other day that I think it Is too bad we 
ever walked out on the Geneva Confer-
ence. One of the greatest mistakes ever 
made in our time in American foreign 
policy was our failure to sign the 1954 
Geneva Treaty. If we had stayed in Ge-
neva as a participating member, we 
might have ended up using our good offi-
ces in bringing about many changes in 
the treaty including the size of the In-
ternational Commission. Instead of the 
treaty provision calling for a Commission 
composed of three members we might 
have obtained agreement for five to seven 
members, with the United States serving 
on it. What a dltrerence It would have 
made in the implementing of the Ge-
neva Conference Treaty I! the United 
States had been a participating member, 
using its great influence to help direct 
and pollee the adm1nlstration of the 
treaty Itself. I think the war Itself might 
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\ ry w U hn\ been a•erted if the United 
Sta had continued t.o sene as a voting 
m mber of the Geneva Conference In 
l 54. 
Ill not too late t.o try to re<>stablish the 
C1 n vn Conference and expand Its m~:m­
b I hlp. To our everlll' llnc crl:dlt, al-
though It took us a long tim to come 
U> thl point, we now support n:•con-
vcnlng the Geneva Conf<'rrnc£•. The ad-
mini tratlon n ached that point some 
15 months after tt was pnmo.Erd by 
th senator from Ala.ocka !Mr. Gaum-
T G) and me. For that. propo al, then we 
we1e att.nc·ked by some administration 
officials, and by the press of this country 
w tth the charge that we were advocat-
Ing negotlat.lons with Communist na-
tions Our reply wa~. "That Is 100 per-
cent correct We better get on with nego-
tiating v.ith the Communists. because 
they are an u ly reality which cannot be 
bombcd out of existence. We are going to 
have to negotiate a peaceful settlement 
w1th them. We must let that time of his-
tory pass until the peoples of Commu-
nist countries become more enlightened 
and arc allowed to develop a better 
standard of living. When this is achieved 
they wlll have economic freedom. When 
they enJOY. ultimately, a better stand-
ard of living and economic freedom, In 
the course of history they will then de-
velop by !>elf-determination their politi-
cal freedom But that may be 50 t.o 100 
years from now " 
This is no overnight problem with an 
~:asy solutwn that confronts us here In 
the United Slates nor, for that matter, 
the rest of the people of the world. What 
I wish to emphasize is that we cannot 
impose either our will or our economic, 
political, social, cultural, or mtlltary sys-
tems on the peopl~; of Asia. 
The trouble is that there arc not many 
p~;r ons thinking about the world 50 to 
100 years from now. Too many are 
thinking about the state of the world 
In the next few years. I fear what the 
:;tate of the world will be if the warmak-
lng pol!cirs of those advocatmg cvcr-
lncrl!asmg escalation or the war In South-
east A~ia leads us into world war III. 
Again I wish to say that the Senator 
from Montana !Mr. MANSFIELD] has per-
fanned a great senice here today by 
urging that the Security Council proceed, 
formally and officially to, give considera-
tiOn to what It can do to try to lead 
the combatants In t.hc war In Vietnam 
to a J)t•acrful solution. 
The S nator from Vermont L tr. 
AIKt:Nl pomt d out tl.at. more than a 
:. ( ar ago v. c til I'd a resolution v. ith the 
ecurlty Council In connection with the 
filhu: of that resolution. the \ei-y day 
we filed it we proceeded to bomb North 
VIetnam As a result, dtscusslon In the 
cloakroom and m the corridors In the 
United Nations building m New York 
City w not at all about our filing a 
r olutlon sugges•mg that the SC<'urlly 
ounc I consld r dl~cussinc the war ln 
Sou h a A In Instead on that hat ful 
dav the d\S('U "ion 111 the Unlt.('d Nations 
consl ted of bitter criticism Of the United 
S for proceeding to escalate mb-
ng into , ·orUl VIetnam th s:~.me day 
thn we pretcndrd to offer w-1 h our other 
hand e.n ol \'e branch. That hurt us ir-
rl!1iocably, It. 1s one of the gr t diplo-
matic mistakes our Go\ ntm nt made 
v.it.hln the United Nat.lons 
But filing a resolution doc not fulfill 
our obligation a 8 signatory to the 
charter 
There are sorr.e spoke~mcn for the 
administration who frequently say, or 
have said in the pa t that we have filed 
a resolution. Filing 8 resolution do not. 
fulfill our commitment as a signatory to 
the charter. We filed a rcsolutwn but It 
was not in a form that required Sccunty 
Council acWon. It was not ln a form that 
required e.ny action either by way of ap-
proval or veto by the Security Council. In 
effect It was an invitation an the part of 
the United States to have the Southeast 
Asian war dtscu ed by the Security 
Council. 
We should have filed n resolution call-
Ing upon the Security Councll to take 
jurisdiction over the war. Then we 
should have insisted upon our right to 
have the resolution considered by the 
Security Council. Please note my use of 
the word "right." We have a right to have 
the Security Council vote for or veto 
our request that the United Nations en-
force a peace In VIetnam. The Security 
Council can take whatever parliamen-
tary action It wants. Some· member 
could veto a resolution calling for peace-
keeping action. That 1s what I want to 
find out. I want to find out what member 
of the Security Council or members of 
the security Council would veto a pro-
posal urged upon the Security Council by 
the United States to proceed to carry out 
the peacekeeping obligations of the 
charter. It is an obllnation lmpo d upon 
every signatory thereto 
As I told the President on more than 
one occasion, and In the very recent past, 
''Mr. President, I want to put France 
and Ru~ Ia on the spot. I want to ftnd 
out If it Is true, as has been suggested a 
good me.ny times by some officials tn ad-
vice to the President, that France or 
Russia, or both, would veto lt." My 
answer to that advice is: Let us find out. 
Let us show the world, ll'S the senator 
from Vermont said by clear impllcatlon 
a few moments ago, what nation or na-
tions In the security Council arc unwil-
ling to carry out their obllgatlons under 
the charter I think we would be sur-
prised over the outcome If we insisted 
upon our right to have the security 
Council vote up or down, yes or no, In 
respccL to its obligations under the 
charter. The charter not only vcsL~ obli-
gations In the &curity Council, but also 
makes it the duty of the security Coun-
Cil to carry them out If a nation proves 
that there is a threat to the peace that 
calls for the lmplement.atlon of the 
charter 
That is the legal Issue that we have 
not pressed. We have not Insisted on gct.-
tlnc a rcspomc on the ls.!ue from the 
Secunty Council . The official dl.'bat.e tha~ 
would take place tn t.hc Secuntr CoW1-
e I would be very salutarY Oh, I know 
that. we have those ln our country who 
ha\c not been very cnthuslll'Stlc about. 
such a debate, because some of it would 
not be a pro-US debate Titer is no 
daub that a debate before t.he Security 
Counctl w-ou1d cause some members o! 
th Secmit · Councll to discuss a bill o! 
tnt na-
rutl.h 
Un1k'<i ta , t.l.me and tim a.ln, in 
re pect to our oonduct In VI tnam 
But let us get I behind u W 
have t.hat d b '1 ntually In e 
form, and we shou1d lla\' It In pari a-
mentary form But. I nw polnt out. that 
it will not be only ~ ol t1 ns of lh 
United States that will be d d, be-
cause. let me say t.o U1e Soviet Union, the 
Sovlc Union also hiUI be(>n \iolatlng t.h 
United Nations Charter. Althou h It is 
one of the cochaJ.nn1 n or the Gt·nc>a 
accords, It hll'S also been violaUng the 
Geneva accords. What arc w afraid of? 
It would be an lnt.(>rnat.lona.l debate 
about what haPI>E'ned factually ln South-
east Asia. It would dl.scu. t.hc legal CQn-
sequenc of tho.se happ nin s Eventu-
ally the debate v,ill come. and we shou1d 
have 1t now before lncrea lng thousands 
of human beings arc killed a.: the rc ult. 
of a war that shou1d be stopped now by 
the members of the United Nations. 
I beheve that the United Nations can 
stop it now. Of course, I know It can be 
polnted out that the Secretary Genl'ral 
made statements, recently quo!Rd ln the 
press, even over the pa.<;t weekend, in 
which he expre,<;sed great doubt that the 
United Nations can be of gT!'at help. 
However, he 1s not the United Nations. 
I share great r gard for what this man 
of peace ha.~ been trylng to do. However, 
on this polnt, I say respcctfu1ly, I be-
lieve he would be proved wrong if the 
members of the Security Council pro-
ceeded to carry out the terms of the 
Charter and their obligations relative 
thereto. I am also convinced that the 
great Secretary General would be the 
first to welcome It If the United Nations 
wou1d only agree to act. 
Mr. President, a debate ln the Security 
Council would be most helpful to clear 
the International atmosphere In regard 
to the situation tn Vietnam As I hav Sllld 
to my President and to others In the exf'-
cut!ve branch, "If our resolution is 
vetoed tn the Security Council, then move 
Into the G neral A: ·J·mbly " We would 
be surprised, In my judgment. by what a 
salutary effect It would havl' on this 
troubled world to hnvr the matter thor-
oughly discus.~ed In the General Asstm-
bly. If the Srcurlty Council refuses to 
act. do not forget that under the charter. 
the General AS&<'mbly could take juri -
diction If It deemed tt necessary, In order 
to stop a threat to the J)('acc of tht world 
Every mr·mlx'r of the General Alii; 'mbly. 
ll'S w·cll Many other country not a mem-
ber of the United 'allons, ha.: now come 
to have a great stake In the ending of 
the war. If the war con lnu • as wa.: 
pointed out by the senator lrom Ken-
tucky [ fr. COOPER] lhis afternoon. and 
olher &nat.ors who shared his vi v. polnL, 
and the w-ar Is cscala d to th point that 
w·e wlll be mvoh cd In a war v.1th China, 
t.hl'n put tt. down on he calendar ll v. 11 
only a matter of Lim before v.:e v.1ll 
be Involved m a v.ar with R That 
wtll mean, or cour • th beglnnin of 
w·orld v. ar III 
Mr fcCARTHY ir Pr lden wtll 
lh Senator from Or on leld? 
tr ORSE I yl ld 
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Mr. McCARTHY. I would add two 
points. First, it is important that we try 
the United Nations to see whether it 
cannot be helpful in this case. Second, 
it is just as important, I think, at this 
time, that the United States should show 
it has confidence and belief in the United 
Nations organization. 
We have been too much inclined to 
treat the United Nations as though it had 
no jurisdiction within the Western 
Hemisphere, in the first place, and no 
real jurisdiction or application if the 
United States should become involved 
in problems in some other part of the 
world. 
Thus, it would be helpful in trying to 
resolve the problem of Vietnam if a deVice 
for building up the United Nations as a 
truly effective instrument for preserving 
and achieving peace could be accom-
plished. 
Mr. MORSE. Those are two very im-
portant points, stated so much better 
than I could state them. I completely 
agree with the observations of the Sen-
ator from Minnesota. 
I think it is important that we follow 
the framework of international law pro-
cedure which is available to us, so that 
there cannot be the slightest question of 
a doubt in the minds of anyone that the 
United States does seek a peaceful solu-
tion to the problem under tre rules of 
international law. 
Is it not going to be sad in the history 
of mankind if we fail to make use of the 
available procedures of the United Na-
tions, the Geneva accords, or any other 
existing treaty which can be used to stop 
this war? If we in ow· time fail history, 
resulting in having a major holocaust 
break out, ending in the loss of millions of 
lives and great devastation throughout 
the world, our generation will be rightly 
condemned for the rest of human history. 
Then what is left of civjlization will come 
forward once again with a proposal to set 
up an international body which will seek 
to prevent another world war. 
Mr. President, how many times do we 
have to go through a repetition of fai!w·e 
on the part of the nations of the world, 
to substitute the rule of law for the jungle 
law of military might going back through 
the last half century? The talk about us-
ing these procedures of the rule of law 
brought forth a League of Nations. We 
know that the United Nations would have 
been better off had the United States not 
walked out on the League of Nations, as 
we walked out of the Geneva conference. 
We must not make that mistake again. 
We are, in effect, by not pressing our 
rights under the charter, walking out on 
the United Nations. I care not how many 
resolutions of mere form are filed; they 
are only resolutions of form, unless we 
press for the exercise of rights in the im-
plementation of the resolutions which we 
file. 
Thus, what concerns me is what people 
100 years from now will say about our 
failure, if we miss this great, historic op-
portunity and duty which the Senator 
from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD! this 
afternoon has pleaded we rise to and 
fulfill. 
Let us face it: We are never going to 
settle this problem bilaterally. That 18 
the position of the United States today. 
As to all the talk about winning and 
getting out: We can win a military vic-
tory, but we cannot get out. We would 
have to police the country with hundreds 
of thousands of American troops for 
decades to come. Eventuaily, we would 
be driven out. 
What is the matter with us? 
The American people constitute only 
6 percent of the population of the world. 
Does the United States think it can 
maintain a permanent, dominating foot-
hold anywhere on the land mass of Asia? 
If we think that, we should have our 
he-ads examined. 
We should eliminate from our minds 
the inexcusable, nationalistic ego that 
has taken over the American people. 
The trouble with us, public opinionwise, 
is that we have developed an almost 
psychopathic ego. 
The world, however, is not going to 
permit us to stay in Asia. If we were 
Asians, we would not permit the United 
States to stay there, either-! mean if 
we were Asians who had not become pup-
pets of the United States. 
So I think our problem is that we 
need to have others come in and be of 
assistance in order to resolve this dif-
ficulty. That is why Senators have heard 
me plead, as I have, now, for 3 years on 
the floor of the Senate, for a multilateral 
settlement of this dispute. We cannot 
accomplish it bilaterally because, as the 
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CooPER] 
stated earlier this afternoon-these are 
my words, but they are consistent with 
his meaning-we have not made uncon-
ditional offers of negotiation at any time 
in Southeast Asia. All of our offers of 
negotiation have not been unconditional 
at all. They have been conditional; we 
just have not expressed the conditions. 
The enemy in fact would have to come 
to the peace table pretty much on our 
terms, recognizing and agreeing that 
there shall be two Vietnams. Who 
is the United States to say that there 
shall be two Vietnams? Let the rest of 
the world decide that question by way of 
procedures that the United Nations could 
develop for a peace-treaty settlement of 
this dispute. I bel1eve we would have to 
kill the Vietnamese and the Vietcong to 
the point of there being only a few left 
before they would ever agree to two 
Vietnarns. Even then the resentment in 
the rest of Asia would be so tremendous 
that they would dig in against us for 
decades to come, out of sympathy both 
for the North Vietnamese and the Viet-
cong because of what the United States 
has been doing, until we were finally 
driven out. 
The only hope for real peace in 
Vietnam is to have other nations take 
over the negotiating. The United States 
would be a party to It, but would not be 
in control. That is why I believe that If 
we would try to have the Security Council 
of the United Nations-! hope in con-
junction with and expanded Geneva 
Conference--take over the settlement of 
the war in Vietnam, a settlement might 
be reached that both sides in the war 
could llve with. It might be a settlement 
which would offer some hope for avoid-
ing world war m, I do not think a bllat-
era.! settlement by the United States 
forced upon the North VIetnamese and 
the Vietcong would ever produce a peace. 
It would only produce a truce leading 
eventually to a massive war in Asia 
against the United States. 
I am willing to let history read the pre-
diction I make this afternoon: a bilateral 
settlement of the war forced upon North 
Vietnam and the Vietcong by the United 
States will eventually be one of the ma-
jor causes of world war III. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MORSE. I yield. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I wish to con-
gratulate the Senator from Oregon for 
the speech he has just made. He has 
made a great contribution to the discus-
sion. 
He said a few minutes ago that one of 
the things that worry him is that 100 
years from now people may say, "You 
did not take advantage of the opportu-
nity to use the United Nations; you did 
not go to the limit in asserting our right 
to have the United Nations pass upon the 
dispute." 
I agree to that. But what worries me 
even more is what is being said today, 
not what may be said in the future-
what is said about the good faith and 
the validity of offers that we have said 
we have made, and statements we have 
made within the last few months, to reach 
a settlement promptly. 
The committee had before it this 
morning our Ambassador to Poland, and 
we discussed at great length the episode 
that occurred last December. There was 
little I heard in that discussion that has 
not already been in the press. In fact. 
one of the bases for the discussion was 
an article by Mr. John Hightower In a 
very well-written article describing this 
matter. There was also a letter to the 
editor of the New York Times. In general, 
the essentials of the December episode 
were confirmed by the Ambassador. 
I ask the Senator if he does not believe 
that today there are very few countries 
who are not our clients, who are not 
dependent upon us, who bel1eve that In 
our efforts, going back to U Thant's effort 
back in 1964, I believe. This is the In-
cident that was discussed by Eric 
Sevareld, and involved Adlai Stevenson. 
That and subsequent efforts, I ask the 
Senator, have they indicated really a 
w111ingness to negotiate a settlement ex-
cept on the basis of North Vietnam's ac-
ceptance of our terms, which would be 
equivalent to a surrender? 
Mr. MORSE. I am so glad the Senator 
from Arkansas has said what he has just 
now stated. It is beyond dispute that the 
overwhelming majority of the nations 
of the world disagree with and disap-
prove the course of action we have been 
following in Vietnam vis-a-vis our inter-
national law obligations. They are very 
much concerned with the fact that we 
have not lived up to those obl1gatlons. 
That is why we cannot point to a single 
major power in the world that has come 
to our side and participated with us in 
the prosecution or this war. Those coun-
tries know they could not reconcile their 
participation in that war with their In-
ternational law obligations. They would 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
• 6 7 CO '.RF~ 10. 'AL RE ORD-~E 'ATE Hay JS, J9o, 
be Joining the United St.ate ln Its vlola-
Uon or its International law obllgatloM. 
fr FULBRIGHT. In thnt connection, 
Is th Senator famlltar v.lth n statement 
v.hlch has been mad by l.he St.at~ De-
pnrt.men . and documented by a lltUe 
pamphl"'t, &hov.lng that 30 nations are 
behind ~.~a on Vie nam, using as ~1dence 
o! Lhelr appro\ al o! our policy and their 
SUJlllOrt of u , their contrlbutlons of 
medicine for the rel!f'! of sick people? 
fr MORSE Or an ambulance. 
fr. FULBRIGHT Or an ambulance, 
or aid to people who are InJured In a 
flood of the l\ll(·kong River, and so on 
Is the Senator familiar with that.? 
Mr MORSE. Yes, I am famlllar with 
lt. I have characterized It as propaganda. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It Is misleading 
Mr. MORSE. Misleading propaganda, 
seeking to give the people of the world 
the Impression that those count,rles sup-
port u.~. 
I see the Senator from Vermont !Mr. 
AIKEN) about to leave the Chamber. I 
wonder If the Senator will remain for 
just a moment. 
Mr. AIKEN. I was about to leave. 
Mr. MORSE. I wanted to ask a ques-
tion on the point we have just brought 
up. I hnve not had a chance to be briefed 
by the chairman of the For~lgn Rela-
tions Subcommittee-who is Senator 
AIKEN-with respect to the recent meet-
Ing on United States-Canadian relations. 
Therefore, I do not know what happened. 
But I was told this afternoon that even 
In some of the parliamentary discussions 
in Ott.awa our delegation found Itself In 
discussions with the Canadians concern-
Ing the war. I was wondering if there 
was anything the Senator was free to 
say about the attitude of the Canadian 
delegates. 
Mr. AIKEN. I do not think~ I think 
the Senator will find that there arc dif-
ferences of opinion In different coun-
tries, and that applies to the United 
States and Canada. 
I think It is safe to say that most peo-
ple in the world wish that the involve-
ment In South VIetnam were not taking 
place. Most of the people In this coun-
try wish It were not taking place. too. 
But I do not know that I can say any-
think with regard to the attitude of the 
Canadian officials. 
I did want to ask a question of the 
majority leader with regard to what 
I think has become a landmark pro-
posal this afternoon, and that Is if he 
has any idea how this propo.o;al w1JI fare 
with the adminl<tratlon. Will the Presi-
dent be willing to t.ake this step toward 
the United Nations, which could con-
ceivably lead to the reestablishment of 
world peace and put a very large road-
block In the way of a third world war? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the 
Senate w111 allow me, of course, I cannot 
sprok for the President of the United 
States, but I can state tJJ.is When I de-
11\·ered the Williams lecture at Jolms 
Hopkins University on January 11, I re-
ceived a call from the President and also 
from Ambal dor Goldberg The Presi-
dent said he was Interested in Lhe pro-
posals which I had stated at Johns Hop-
ns Uni\ mty, to .e lh mater 
before the United Nations and plru:lc lt 
before lhe Sl'C'Urit) CouncU, and v.ould 
I get together and t.n1k v.1th Am d r 
Goldberg and S< cret.an· General U Thant 
and disc the matu-r I d, "Y sir " 
A few days lat.cr I went to lh United 
Nations I did talk '1\ith Ambassad r 
Goldberg and the Secretary General. At 
that time Ambe.ssador Gold~rg believed 
It ml ht not be advisable to present It to 
the Security Council; that perhaps more 
could be done on the ba.s18 of cont.act.s 
which had been OJ)Cnl'd On that basis, It 
was not pushed. 
In December of 1966, follo\\ing that 
up, the President sent a lctt,er to Am-
bassador Goldberg, to be dell\ errd to 
Mr. U Thant. asking him to undertake 
a more thorough Inquiry In the direction 
of reaching the ne{!Otlatlng t.able. to the 
end thnt an honorable truce could be 
achieved. Nothing came of it. Various 
!actors Intervened. some of which have 
been mentioned this afternoon. 
I think the Secretary General, Mr. U 
Thant, has done all he could possibly do. 
I have nothing but commendation for his 
efforts. Maybe this approach wlll afford 
an opportunity to place the matter be· 
fore the United Nations, becatL<;e as the 
Senator has pointed out, In January 1965, 
the United SLates put a resolution before 
the SCCurity Council-a resolution which 
Is not subjrct to a veto. That resolution 
is till there. 
So I would assume. on the basis of 
what has been done, that the President 
would not be unfavorably dtsposrd or ln 
opposition, but would look with favor on 
this proposal. 
Mr. AIKEN. I personally do not be-
lleve the President would reject the pro-
po.~al, which has been made m all sin-
cerity, and which could conceivably let 
dO\\"n the bars on the road to peace 
Mr MANSFIELD. I would agree with 
the Senator in his analysis 
Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Ar-
kansas was speaking Ju.st before the 
Senator from Vermont made his state-
ment. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I was 
about to make was thnt, based on what 
I believe were erroneous, misleading 
statements about the support of other 
countries, and based on reports indicat-
ing that we have made those efforts for 
negotiations. the people of this country 
believe that we have made good faith 
and open efforts at negotiations--by 
which I think ordinary people mean 
honorable, open negotiations--they be-
lleve we have made an open offer for a 
compromi~e Reltlement. as contrasted to 
a dictated settlement or a su.rrender. 
I mention this partly by way of pro-
pounding my ovm explanation, but 
partly because this was brought out in 
the hearings of last year by mrmbers of 
the Committee on Foreign Relation.'!, 
when we had as witnesses members of 
the administration, particularly G nera.l 
Taylor, and finally the Secretary of 
State, to develop the point as to what 
Is meant by "settlement by negotiation," 
and whether it ls equivalent to a sur-
render. 
It ms t me thn Lhe cond t.lo 
v.hich hnHl been t~erall do nt 
to urrendcr. th t l.s, a total us n-
slon o! any aid on the part. of Han 1 
1l ouJd , It s rik m{, lh equb"8.1t 1 f 
a surrl'nder 
fr fORSF. I think It ~~oould be n rur-
r nd r: and also a surrender of h tr 
d Ire to lun·e v. orkNI out a unitlt~d VI t-
nam. 
. fr FULBRIGHT. Yes And .,.,e ha'e 
been, I think, unwlll!ng at arn time LO 
ace pt even the possibility of a untned 
Vietnam. 
1r. ~fORSE. That I correct 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the n t.or 
agree? 
Mr. MORSE. Ye We have n In-
sisting that the be an lndcl>('ndent 
South VIetnam. which, again, In my 
Judgment, we have no right to In t 
upon under international Jaw. 
But I close, Mr. President. by ~U~ain 
expr . sing my great appreciation to the 
Senator from Montana for his public 
discussion of this matter. We all know. 
Mr. President, that the background for 
the dlscus.~ion does now show from Lhc 
public remarks that the Senator ha.~ 
made today. This man. may I say, ha~ 
been at work for a long time, trying to 
help bring about a peaceful solution or 
this problem within the framework or 
the existing peacekeeping procedures or 
international Jaw. 
Mr. Pre!'<!dent, I suggest the ab encc 
of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER !Mr. PFLL 
In the ·chair). The clerk will caiJ the 
roll. 
The legislative clerk proceeded to call 
the roll. 
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I a k 
unonimous con.~cnt that the order for 
the quorum caiJ be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
obJection, It Is so ordered. 
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